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Abstract
The recent global financial crisis has shown that the importance of financial
market developments for business cycle fluctuations had been underestimated
substantially. Since financial factors were only peripherally integrated into stan-
dard macroeconomic models, these models significantly had underestimated the
scope and persistence of the financial crisis.
This dissertation contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensible
theoretical and empirical framework for analyzing the propagation of shocks to
macroeconomic uncertainty and financial stress on economic activity. To do
so, this dissertation employs both theoretical and empirical methods, such as a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, dynamic factor models,
and vector autoregressive models. The nonlinear nature of uncertainty and
financial stress is always taken into account by applying appropriate analytical
and numerical methods.
In Chapter 2, we analyze the role of macroeconomic uncertainty for macroe-
conomic fluctuations in a theoretical model. We set up a medium-sized DSGE
model that incorporates heterogeneous agents and a banking sector. The bank-
ing sector operates in a not fully competitive environment. We find that frictions
in credit supply amplify the effects of uncertainty shocks on economic activity.
This amplification channel stems mainly from the stickiness in banking retail
interest rates. This stickiness reduces the effectiveness in the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy.
In Chapter 3, I derive a financial stress index (FSI) for Germany, using a dy-
namic approximate factor model that summarizes a stress component of various
financial variables. I estimate the model with a combined maximum-likelihood
and Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm, allowing for mixed frequencies
and an arbitrary pattern of missing data. Subsequently, I analyze the effects
of financial stress on economic activity in a threshold vector autoregressive
(TVAR) model. I find that if the index exceeds a certain threshold, an increase
in financial stress leads to a decline in economic activity, whereas if the stress
level is below this threshold, economic activity is not significantly affected.
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In Chapter 4, we develop a FSI for France that can be used as a real-time
composite indicator for the state of financial stability. We take 17 financial
variables from different market segments and extract a common stress com-
ponent using a dynamic approximate factor model. In particular, we use the
same methodology as in Chapter 3. Subsequently, we use a Markov-Switching
Bayesian VAR model (MSBVAR) and show that during episodes of high finan-
cial stress economic activity is significantly lower, whereas during episodes of
low financial stress economic activity is not significantly affected.
In Chapter 5, we analyze the international transmission of financial stress
and its effects on economic activity. We construct country-specific monthly
FSIs using dynamic factor models from 1970 until 2012 for 20 countries. We
show that there is a strong co-movement of the FSIs during financial crises and
that the FSIs of financially open countries are relatively more correlated to FSIs
of other countries. Subsequently, we investigate the international transmission
of financial stress and its impact on economic activity in a Global VAR (GVAR)
model. We show that i) financial stress is quickly transmitted internationally, ii)
financial stress has a lagged but persistent negative effect on economic activity,
and iii) that economic slowdowns induce only limited financial stress.
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Zusammenfassung
Die globale Finanzkrise der Jahre 2008 und 2009 hat gezeigt, dass der Einfluss
von Fehlentwicklungen an den Finanzmärkten auf die Konjunktur lange Zeit
deutlich unterschätzt wurde. Da Finanzmarktvariablen in den traditionellen
makroökonomischen Modellen nur eine untergeordnete Rolle gespielt hatten,
wurden sowohl das Ausmaß als auch die Länge der Finanzkrise dramatisch
unterschätzt.
Diese Dissertation soll zum einen dazu beitragen, die Finanzstabilität in
verschiedenen Ländern anhand einer Vielzahl von Indikatoren in Echtzeit zu
messen und eine frühzeitige Erkennung von Fehlentwicklungen an den Finanzmärk-
ten zu ermöglichen. Hierzu werden Finanzmarktstressindikatoren berechnet, die
einen möglichst umfangreichen Überblick über die Stabilität des jeweiligen Fi-
nanzsystems geben sollen. Zum anderen sollen die konjunkturellen Auswirkun-
gen von Finanzmarktstress und damit zusammenhängenden Unsicherheitsschocks
analysiert werden. Hierzu greift die Dissertation methodisch sowohl auf ein the-
oretisches Modell, in Form eines dynamischen stochastischen Modells des all-
gemeinen Gleichgewichts (DSGE), als auch auf empirische Methoden, in Form
von vektorautoregressiven (VAR) Modellen und dynamischen Faktormodellen,
zurück. Dabei wird stets berücksichtigt, dass Nichtlinearitäten bei Finanz-
marktschocks von essentieller Bedeutung sind. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden
Methoden angewandt, die mit der nichtlinearen Natur von Unsicherheitsschocks
und Finanzmarktschocks adäquat umgehen.
In Kapitel 2 wird ein DSGE Modell mit einem stilisierten Bankensektor
hergeleitet und die Auswirkungen von makroökonomischen Unsicherheitsschocks
auf die Konjunktur untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass kreditangebotsseitige Frik-
tionen die konjunkturellen Auswirkungen von Unsicherheitsschocks verstärken.
Darüber hinaus wird gezeigt, dass die Geldpolitik unter Friktionen am Kred-
itmarkt die negativen Effekte von Unsicherheitsschocks nicht vollständig kom-
pensieren kann.
In Kapitel 3 wird ein Finanzmarktstressindikator (FSI) für Deutschland en-
twickelt, der sich aus Finanzmarktvariablen verschiedener Marktsegmente zusam-
mensetzt. Der Indikator wird mithilfe eines dynamischen Faktormodells über
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einen Zeitraum von 1970 bis 2012 konstruiert. Anhand des Indikators wird
untersucht, in wie weit sich die Finanzstabilität auf die makroökonomische Sta-
bilität auswirkt. Hierzu wird ein VAR Schwellenwertmodell (Threshold VAR)
angewandt, mit dem zwei Regime identifiziert werden: ein Regime mit hohem
Finanzmarktstress und ein Regime mit niedrigem Finanzmarktstress. Während
sich Veränderungen des Finanzmarktstresses merklich auf die Realwirtschaft
auswirken, wenn der FSI oberhalb des Schwellenwerts liegt, hat er keinen Ein-
fluss wenn er sich unterhalb dieses Schwellenwertes befindet.
In Kapitel 4 wird ein Finanzmarktstressindikator für Frankreich entwickelt.
Dabei wird die Methode aus Kapitel 3 angewandt. Es wird gezeigt, dass der
Indikator wichtige Ereignisse in der jüngeren Geschichte gut abbildet. Darüber
hinaus werden anhand eines Bayesianischen Markov-Switching Modells (MSB-
VAR) ein Regime mit hohem Finanzmarktstress und ein Regime mit niedrigem
Finanzmarktstress identifiziert. Ferner zeigen wir, dass Finanzmarktstress die
Konjunktur in Frankreich nur dämpft, wenn sich die Wirtschaft in einem Umfeld
mit hohem Finanzmarktstress befindet.
In Kapital 5 werden der Grad der internationalen Synchronisierung und die
internationalen Auswirkungen von Finanzmarktstress untersucht. Hierzu wer-
den Finanzmarktstressindikatoren für 20 Länder berechnet und ihre Korrela-
tion über den Zeitraum von 1970 bis 2012 analysiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass das
Ausmaß der Korrelation maßgeblich vom finanziellen Offenheitsgrad der Volk-
swirtschaften abhängt. Darüber hinaus wird wir anhand eines globalen vek-
torautoregressiven Modells (GVAR) gezeigt, dass sich Finanzmarktstress über
Ländergrenzen hinweg sehr schnell ausbreitet und dass globale Finanzmark-
tschocks lang anhaltende dämpfende Auswirkungen auf die Konjunktur haben.
v
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CHAPTER1
Introduction
The recent global financial crisis has shown that the importance of financial
market developments for business cycle fluctuations had been underestimated
substantially. Since financial factors were only peripherally integrated into stan-
dard macroeconomic models, these models significantly had underestimated the
scope and persistence of the financial crisis. In general, the analytical frame-
work that was usually used until the beginning of the financial crisis was unable
to systematically incorporate the most relevant elements (Borio (2011a)).
In the meantime, central banks, academic researchers and private financial
institutions have increasingly worked on developing new measures for analyz-
ing and predicting extraordinary financial events.1 Since financial instability
is likely to have negative consequences for economic activity, it is crucial for
macroeconomic policy to identify financial imbalances and financial stress at an
early stage in order to implement appropriate policy measures.
Likewise, macroeconomic uncertainty has proven to be a significant driver
during the recent financial crisis (Bloom (2009) and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
(2012)).2 An increase in macroeconomic uncertainty may lead to precautionary
behavior of firms and households such that firms temporarily pause their invest-
ment and hiring, and households reduce their consumption spending. While in
partial equilibrium output and its components generally co-move after an un-
1In practice, the European Central Bank (ECB) has developed indicators that are aimed
to "measure the current state of instability, i.e. the current level of frictions, stresses and
strains in the financial system" in the euro area (European Central Bank (2011) and Holló
et al. (2012)), the IMF has developed financial stress indexes to identify financial turmoils in
advanced economies, and Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Davig and Hakkio (2010) developed
financial stress indexes for the Federal Reserve which are frequently used to monitor financial
stability.
2Macroeconomic uncertainty can be interpreted as a wider distribution of expected future
shocks to total factor productivity, for instance.
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certainty shock, this may not be the case in a general equilibrium framework
(Basu and Bundick (2012) and Christiano et al. (2013)). It is therefore impor-
tant to further investigate how macroeconomic uncertainty shocks propagate
to the economy and which factors are meaningful for the conduct of economic
policy.
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several dimensions by propos-
ing theoretical and empirical tools for analyzing the role of macroeconomic un-
certainty and financial stress for business cycle fluctuations. First, it provides a
comprehensive theoretical DSGE model that incorporates heterogeneous agents,
a stylized banking sector, and stochastic volatility to investigate the transmis-
sion of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks to real economic activity. The model
provides a framework for investigating macroeconomic uncertainty shocks un-
der credit market imperfections. We show that supply side constraints in the
financial sector play an important role in amplifying the effects of uncertainty
shocks (Chapter 2). Second, this dissertation presents a broad empirical inves-
tigation of uncertainty and financial stress. To this end, it provides a number
of FSIs for several countries. In particular, it provides a comprehensible FSI
as a measure of financial stability for Germany and France and investigates
its propagation mechanism on economic activity using nonlinear VAR models
(Chapter 3 and 4). Finally, it analyzes the transmission of financial stress in
a multi-country framework and its cross-border effects (Chapter 5). In this
context, it analyzes the relevance of international synchronization of financial
stress and its international impact on economic activity.
1.1 Review of chapter 23
In this chapter (joint work with Dario Bonciani) we investigate the effects of
macroeconomic uncertainty shocks on economic activity under credit market
imperfections and a frictional banking sector. Since uncertainty shocks mainly
occur when the financial system is under strain, we analyze how increasing
uncertainty transmits to real macroeconomic aggregates in a model that incor-
porates a stylized banking sector.
3This chapter is based on: Bonciani and van Roye (2013). Uncertainty shocks, banking
frictions, and economic activity. Kiel Working Paper No. 1843, The Kiel Institute for the
World Economy.
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Our contribution to the literature is threefold: first, we set up an empir-
ical analysis for the euro area and show that uncertainty shocks matter for
economic activity. Using a Bayesian vector autoregression, we find that an in-
crease in uncertainty leads to a persistent decrease of GDP and investment.
Second, we analyze the effects of uncertainty shocks on business cycle fluctu-
ations using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that
incorporates nominal rigidities and financial frictions. We build a multi-sector
model featuring credit frictions and borrowing constraints for entrepreneurs as
in Iacoviello (2005) and price rigidities as in Rotemberg (1982). Moreover, the
model is augmented by a stylized banking sector inspired by Gerali et al. (2010).
In order to isolate the effects that stem from macroeconomic uncertainty, we
apply a nonlinear moving average perturbation technique and approximate the
model up to third-order.
The main results of our analysis are as follows. First, we show that frictions
in the banking sector considerably amplify the negative effects of uncertainty
shocks. Second, we reconcile the stronger effects of uncertainty shocks found in
the data by simulating an uncertainty shock while the economy is in a recession.
We argue that there could be strong nonlinear effects due to the financial crisis
and show that in a recession the impact of uncertainty shocks is potentially
much larger.
My own contribution to this chapter is as follows. My co-author Dario Bon-
ciani and I almost exclusively developed the model together. We jointly wrote
the code and discussed the results. Finally, we jointly wrote the text and revised
it.
1.2 Review of chapter 34
In this chapter I construct a financial stress index (FSI) for Germany and inves-
tigate its relevance for business cycle fluctuations. I use 18 financial variables
and aggregate them into a single composite index that can be used as a real
time index for the state of financial stability. In order to construct the index,
I use a dynamic approximate factor model with a broad measure for financial
4This chapter is based on: van Roye (2013). Financial Stress and Economic Activity in
Germany. Empirica, DOI: 10.1007/s10663-013-9224-0, pages 1-27, Springer US.
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stress including financial variables for the banking sector, the securities mar-
kets, the stock markets, and the foreign exchange market. As Brave and Butters
(2011), I allow for the estimation of an unbalanced panel and account for the
issue of ragged data edges due to publication lags in order to cope with longer
time series and real time data. This is achieved by using a methodology that
combines maximum likelihood and EM algorithm estimation techniques. This
technique guarantees an efficient estimation for an arbitrary pattern of missing
data as proposed by Banbura and Modugno (2012). Subsequently, I investigate
the propagation mechanism of financial stress on macroeconomic aggregates by
employing a threshold VAR approach. The impulse response analysis is based
upon two-regime linear impulse response functions as well as nonlinear impulse
responses as in Balke (2000).
Results can be summarized as follows. The FSI appropriately traces impor-
tant events in German economic history. Moreover, given the results of the
VAR analysis, the index can be considered as an additional indicator for the
business cycle. While shocks to the index do not have significant effects on
economic activity when the level of financial stress is low, they have a major
impact when the index exceeds a certain threshold. Against this background, an
increase in the index can be considered as an additional early warning indicator
for an economic contraction in Germany when the FSI is above the estimated
threshold.
1.3 Review of chapter 45
In this chapter (joint work with Sofiane Aboura) we construct a FSI that can
be used as a single composite indicator for the state of financial stability and
financial fragilities in France. We take 17 financial variables from different
market segments and extract a common stress component using a dynamic
approximate factor model. We estimate the model with a combined maximum-
likelihood and EM algorithm allowing for mixed frequencies and an arbitrary
pattern of missing data. We apply a similar methodology as in van Roye (2013),
presented in the previous chapter. To gain insights of how financial stress affects
economic activity, we employ a Markov-Switching Bayesian VAR (MSBVAR)
5This chapter is based on: Aboura and van Roye (2013). Financial stress and economic
dynamics: an application to France. Kiel Working Paper No. 1834, The Kiel Institute for
the World Economy.
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model. We present the smoothed state probabilities and regime dependent
impulse responses.
The main results of this chapter are as follows. First, we show that the
FSI traces important events in French economic history. Financial stress was
extraordinary high after the presidential election of François Mitterand in 1981,
when political uncertainty rose sharply due to the government’s announcement
of nationalizing private companies. Furthermore, we identify peaks during the
oil crisis in 1973/1974, the stock market crash 1987, the collapse of the Soviet
regime in 1991, and the Asian and Russian crisis in 1997/1998. The most
pronounced increase of financial stress in France was during the recent global
financial crisis. Second, by using a Markov-Switching model, we identify two
regimes; i.e. a high stress and a low stress regime. We show that an increase
in financial stress leads to lower economic activity when the economy is in the
high-stress regime. Movements in the FSI in a low stress regimes do not lead
to significant changes in economic activity.
My own contribution to this chapter is as follows. In general, the paper
was joint work. I set up and estimated both the dynamic factor model and
the MSBVAR. We wrote and revised the paper jointly. My co-author Sofiane
Aboura provided me with the data and data transformations. In particular, he
estimated the volatility models.
1.4 Review of chapter 56
In this chapter (joint work with Jonas Dovern) we analyze the international
transmission of financial stress and its impact on economic activity. We con-
struct country-specific monthly financial stress indexes (FSI) using dynamic fac-
tor models from 1970 until 2012 for 20 countries. We conduct a cross-country
correlation analysis and present statistical properties of the FSI. Subsequently,
we investigate the international propagation of financial stress in a Global VAR
(GVAR) model. We show that financial stress has a persistent negative effect
on overall economic activity.
6This chapter is based on: Dovern and van Roye (2013). International transmission of
financial stress: evidence from a GVAR. Kiel Working Paper No. 1844, The Kiel Institute
for the World Economy.
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Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we construct a compre-
hensible data set of financial stress indexes for 20 countries. We also provide
external (trade-weighted) financial stress indexes for every country. Second,
we show that country-specific FSIs co-move especially during financial stress
events. The FSIs of countries with a higher degree of financial openness are
stronger correlated than the FSIs of countries with a lower degree. Moreover,
co-movement of financial stress increases over time reflecting a deepening in
financial integration. Third, we find that global shocks in financial stress prop-
agate significantly to industrial production in the analyzed countries. In par-
ticular, we find that i) financial stress is quickly transmitted internationally, ii)
financial stress has a lagged but persistent negative effect on economic activity,
and iii) that economic slowdowns induce only limited financial stress.
My own contribution to this chapter is as follows. In general, the paper was
joint work. I collected the data for each country and set up and estimated the
dynamic factor model. In addition, I implemented the correlation analysis of
financial stress. My co-author Jonas Dovern set up and estimated the GVAR
model. We wrote and revised the paper jointly.
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Uncertainty shocks, banking frictions,
and economic activity1
2.1 Introduction
The negative effect of uncertainty on economic activity is a prevalent topic in
both economic policy and academic research. Policy makers and economists
have repeatedly claimed that high macroeconomic uncertainty among investors
hinders the economy to recover. While there has been a vastly growing liter-
ature on the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks, led by the seminal
paper by Bloom (2009), there has been relatively little research on the effects
of uncertainty shocks under financial frictions. In particular, the existing lit-
erature has not yet explained the relationship between uncertainty shocks and
frictional banking markets. This chapter tries to fill this gap by investigating
the effects of uncertainty shocks when banks operate in monopolistic compe-
tition and there is an imperfect pass-through of the central bank’s policy rate
to both the deposit and the loan rate. Both frictions have been shown to be
theoretically and empirically important at business-cycle frequency.2
Our contribution is threefold: first, we provide an empirical motivation for the
study of uncertainty shocks. Therefore we estimate a small Bayesian Vector
Autoregressive (BVAR) model and show that higher uncertainty reduces main
macroeconomic aggregates in the euro area. Secondly, we analyze the effects of
1This chapter is based on: Bonciani and van Roye (2013). Uncertainty shocks, banking
frictions, and economic activity. Kiel Working Paper No. 1843, The Kiel Institute for the
World Economy.
2The importance of monopolistic competition in the banking sector has been extensively
documented in the microeconomic literature (see for instance Klein (1971) and Monti (1972)).
In addition, there is vast empirical evidence for imperfect pass-through of the monetary policy
rate to the retail rates (see for instance Sorensen and Werner (2006) and Gerali et al. (2010)).
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uncertainty shocks on business cycle fluctuations using a Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model which incorporates nominal rigidities and
financial frictions. We build a multi-sector model featuring credit frictions and
borrowing constraints for entrepreneurs as in Iacoviello (2005) and price rigidi-
ties as in Rotemberg (1982). Moreover, the model is augmented by a stylized
banking sector inspired by Gerali et al. (2010). The main results of our anal-
ysis is that frictions in the banking sector considerably amplify the negative
effects of uncertainty shocks on economic activity and make uncertainty shocks
more persistent than otherwise. Thirdly, we reconcile the stronger effects of
uncertainty shocks found in the data, compared with the relatively little ones
obtained with our DSGE model. We explain that there could be strong nonlin-
ear effects due to the financial crisis and show that in a recession the impact of
uncertainty shocks is potentially much larger.
The relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty shocks and economic ac-
tivity is widely analyzed in academic research. Economic theory provides a
comprehensible framework in which higher uncertainty affects economic activity
through irreversible investments, marginal revenues and precautionary savings
(Bernanke (1983), Hartman (1976) and Abel (1983), Leland (1968) and Kimball
(1990)). While almost all academic research papers find significant negative ef-
fects of uncertainty shocks on key economic variables in a partial equilibrium
setup, the effects in a general equilibrium are more disputed. While Bachmann
and Bayer (2011) claim there are no significant effects of uncertainty shocks in
general equilibrium, Basu and Bundick (2012) claim that there are, given that
prices are sticky and the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound.
Born and Pfeifer (2011) analyze the contribution of monetary and fiscal policy
uncertainty shocks in the United States during the Great Recession. They show
that while policy uncertainty can be found in the data, it is unlikely to have
played a large role driving business cycle fluctuations. They find even smaller
effects of uncertainty shocks to total factor productivity (TFP). Leduc and Liu
(2012) study the macroeconomic effects of uncertainty shocks in a DSGE model
with labor search frictions and sticky prices. They show that uncertainty shocks
act like aggregate demand shocks since they increase unemployment and reduce
inflation.
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Albeit there is a a vast growing literature on the effects of uncertainty shocks,
only few researchers have analyzed their impact of under financial frictions.
Gilchrist et al. (2010) show, both empirically and theoretically, how time-
varying uncertainty interacts with financial market frictions in dampening eco-
nomic fluctuations. Using a standard bond-contracting framework, they find
that an increase in uncertainty is beneficial to equity holders while it is costly
for bond holders, since uncertainty shocks leads to an increase in the cost of
capital and ultimately to declining investment. In addition, decreasing credit
supply hinders efficient capital reallocation which leads to a further decrease in
TFP. Christiano et al. (2013) apply a DSGE model incorporating the financial
accelerator mechanism originally proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG)
and estimate it for the U.S. economy. They find that risk shocks (i.e., changes
in the volatility of cross-sectional idiosyncratic uncertainty) play an important
role for shaping U.S. business cycles. While Christiano et al. (2013) exclu-
sively analyze idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks, Balke (2000) also investigate
the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty shocks under credit frictions. Using a
model with agency costs, they show that the financial accelerator amplifies the
contractionary effects under price stickiness. In equal measure, Cesa-Bianchi
and Fernandez-Corugedo (2013) show that credit frictions amplify the negative
impact of uncertainty shocks on output, investment and consumption. They
employ a modified version of the financial accelerator model as in Faia and
Monacelli (2007). In addition, they find that micro uncertainty shocks seem to
be quantitatively more important than a macro uncertainty shocks. This strand
of literature using DSGE models based on the financial accelerator mechanism
focuses only on frictions that characterize the demand side of the financial sec-
tor.
In this chapter, in contrast, we show that supply side constraints in the finan-
cial sector also play an important role in amplifying the effects of uncertainty
shocks. Accounting for sticky retail interest rates determines an imperfect pass-
through of the central bank interest rate to the private sector. The transmission
mechanism of the monetary policy is hence weakened and less effective in offset-
ting the dampening effects of the uncertainty shock. This study is most closely
related to Basu and Bundick (2012), Christiano et al. (2013), and Balke (2000).
While Basu and Bundick (2012) use a standard New Keynesian model to show
the effects of aggregate uncertainty, we assume that entrepreneurs are credit
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constrained and that lending is implemented through an imperfectly competi-
tive banking sector.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we present em-
pirical evidence of the effects of uncertainty shocks on economic activity by
estimating a small BVAR model for the euro area. In section 2.3 we present
short theoretical channels through which uncertainty shocks transmit to eco-
nomic activity and provide simple economic intuitions. In section 2.4 we present
the DSGE model with borrowing constrained entrepreneurs and a banking sec-
tor that is monopolistically competitive. In section 2.5 we describe the solution
method and simulate the model deriving the main channel through which over-
all uncertainty transmits via the banking sector to the real economy and drives
business cycle fluctuations. Finally, we present concluding remarks in section
2.6.
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2.2 Empirical evidence
In order to provide evidence on the relevance of uncertainty shocks on economic
fluctuations, we estimate a small BVAR model using euro area data.
2.2.1 Data
As a proxy for aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty we use an index that is
derived from the volatility of financial market variables in the euro area. In
particular, we use the VSTOXX which provides a measure of market expecta-
tions of short-term up to long-term volatility based on the EuroStoxx50 options
prices.3
In order to investigate the effects of aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty
for business cycle fluctuations, we collect further data from the Area Wide
model database. We collect data for real GDP, fixed asset investment, the
money market rate and the loan rate to non-financial corporations. A detailed
description of the data can be found in the appendix.
2.2.2 Evidence from a BVAR model
To investigate the effects of uncertainty on economic dynamics in the euro area
we estimate a small BVAR model with orthogonalized shocks to macroeconomic
uncertainty. The available data sample for the euro area is relatively short.
We estimate the model with quarterly data starting in 2003.4 Against this
background, we choose to estimate the model with Bayesian techniques, since
sampling errors in estimating error bands for the impulse responses can occur
when using a highly over parametrized model (Sims and Zha (1998)). The
BVAR model has the following form:
yt = B1Yt−1 + · · ·+BpYt−p + t, where t ∼ N (0,Σ), (2.1)
where yt = [V OLt ∆yt ∆fait ∆ct rt rbt ]′ is a vector consisting of the following
variables: the implied volatility of EUROSTOXX 50 option prices (V OLt) as
3Basu and Bundick (2012) use a similar implied volatility index for the United States
(VIX) in order to identify the uncertainty shock.
4The loan rate for non-financial corporations is only available from the beginning of 2003.
The other time series are available for a longer time horizon. We also estimated the model
with a longer time horizon without the loan rate. The results do not substantially differ from
the ones reported here. Results are available upon request.
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uncertainty variable, the logarithm of real GDP (yt) as an indicator for eco-
nomic activity, the logarithm of fixed asset investment (fait), the logarithm of
private consumption, the EONIA-money market rate (rt) as an indicator for
the ECB’s monetary policy stance and the loan rate rbt . B1, . . . , Bp are (q × q)
autoregressive matrices and Σ is the (q×q) variance-covariance matrix. For the
prior distribution of the parameters we choose Jeffreys’ improper prior to help
improve the estimation of error bands for impulse responses. To be precise, the
distribution on the parameters B and Σ i given by:
p(B,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−ny+12 . (2.2)
In our baseline model, we choose a lower triangular Choleski identification, or-
dering the uncertainty index first, such that on impact shocks to the uncertainty
index have impact on the real variables. This ordering has been established in
a vast majority of the literature (See for example Bloom (2009) and Baker et al.
(2012)).5 Vice versa, we assume that uncertainty is on impact not affected by
shocks to the other endogenous variables. The impulse responses are depicted in
Figure 2.1. While the black solid lines are median responses of the endogenous
variables to one-standard-deviation increase in the innovations to uncertainty,
the shaded areas represent 68 percent confidence intervals.
The IRF indicate that an exogenous increase of uncertainty leads to a per-
sistent decline in real GDP and fixed asset investment. The effect on private
consumption, the policy rate and the loan rate are very small, however. The
strongest effect of a one-standard deviation increase in uncertainty hits after 4
quarters. While the median responses of GDP is a decline of about 0.2 percent,
investment drops by about 0.5 percent. The results are in line with other em-
pirical studies about the effects of uncertainty for other countries.6 Our results
indicate that uncertainty has negative business cycle effects in the euro area.
5A different ordering of the variables, in particular when the uncertainty index is ordered
last, yields qualitatively similar results. Results are available upon request.
6Bloom (2009) and Baker et al. (2012) show in a VAR model that uncertainty leads to a
persistent decrease in industrial production in the United States. Denis and Kannan (2013)
find persistently negative effects of uncertainty on monthly GDP indicators for the United
Kingdom and on economic sentiment indicators.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse responses after a macro-uncertainty shock
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Notes: The volatility of the VSTOXX is ordered first. The black solid lines are median
responses of the endogenous variables to one-standard-deviation increase in the innovations
to uncertainty. Shaded areas represent 68 percent error bands.
2.3 Uncertainty shocks: Economic theory and
intuition
The effects of uncertainty shocks on economic activity have been extensively
analyzed in the microeconomic literature over the past decades. In particular
it has been highlighted that increases in uncertainty affect the economy mainly
via three channels (Born and Pfeifer (2011)):
1. Real options channel;
2. Convex marginal revenue product channel;
3. Precautionary savings channel.
The microeconomic effects of these channels are potentially contrasting and
are the result of partial equilibrium analysis. In a general equilibrium framework
the aforementioned effects may or may not be completely offset. In this section
we briefly describe these channels and put them into a general equilibrium
context.
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Real options channel
The real option channel refers to the option value associated with irreversible
investments. In particular, when an investment is utterly or even partially irre-
versible (i.e. once constructed, it cannot be undone without facing high costs)
and the investor has an imperfect information concerning the future returns
on long-term projects, there is an option value associated with avoiding such
an investment (Bernanke (1983)). The agent who decides to postpone an in-
vestment, giving up short-term returns, will have the option in the next period
either to invest or to further postpone the expenditure. As the investor is not
endowed with perfect foresight on the returns on his investments, waiting and
therefore obtaining new relevant information makes it more likely for her to
make a better investment decision.
Investment opportunities, arising for instance from patents or from the own-
ership of land and natural resources, are similar to a financial call option, while
investing in capital which may be sold in the future at a higher price, is effec-
tively equivalent to purchasing a put option. A call (put) option is a contract
that gives the right to the buyer to purchase (sell) an underlying asset at a
predetermined price. When a firm makes an irreversible investment expendi-
ture, it exercises its option to invest, as it gives up the possibility of waiting
for new information to arrive that might affect the desirability or timing of the
expenditure. It cannot disinvest in case the market conditions change adversely.
Obviously irreversible investments are particularly sensitive to risk concerning
future cash flows, interest rates or the future price of capital. Uncertainty
has a negative effect on the payoff of the agent owning the "call option" (the
investment opportunity), while it has a positive effect on the payoff of the agents
owning the "put option" (who already invested and can resell the capital at a
predetermined higher price). As a bottom line, the real options effect may
dampen economic activity when including investment and capital in our model.
This is particularly the case when firms additionally face investment adjustment
costs.
Convex marginal revenue product channel
In models with risk-neutral competitive firms with convex adjustment costs,
if the marginal revenue product of capital is a strictly convex function of the
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price of output, then investment is an increasing function of the variance of
price and of TFP. This means that increases in uncertainty about the price of
output and TFP determines an increase in investment (Hartman (1976); Abel
(1983)). All in all, this channel shows that higher uncertainty may result in
accelerating investment and a boost in economic activity, which contrasts with
the real options channel described above.
Precautionary savings channel
Under the assumption of additivity of the utility function or of decreasing risk
aversion, an increase in uncertainty with respect to the future income stream
leads to an increase in savings (Leland (1968)). Faced with higher uncertainty,
agents reduce their consumption and supply more labor in order to insure them-
selves against future negative events. In a closed economy, the increase in sav-
ings determines a one-to-one increase in investment. Later on, Carroll and
Samwick (1998) show that this behavior also holds empirically and that higher
uncertainty about household’s future income distribution leads to precaution-
ary savings. As a bottom line, the precautionary savings channel may lead to
an increase in investment and a decline in consumption. The overall effect on
output cannot be determined a priori.
Effects in General Equilibrium
The effects discussed above are potentially contrasting and are the result of
partial equilibrium analysis. While in partial equilibrium output and its com-
ponents generally co-move after an uncertainty shock, this may not be the case
in a general equilibrium framework (Basu and Bundick (2012)). The difficulty
of generating business cycle co-movements and sizeable effects of uncertainty
on major macroeconomic aggregates stems from the endogeneity of the real in-
terest rate. In a standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, in which prices
are fully flexible and there is no role for monetary policy, consumption falls
and labor increases because of precautionary behavior. Given that capital is
predetermined, the increase in labor input leads to an increase in output and
savings. In a closed economy this implies a hike in investment. In contrast, in a
New Keynesian model (NKM), characterized by sticky prices and time varying
markups of prices over marginal costs, this is not necessarily the case. After an
uncertainty shock, prices do not adjust immediately to changing marginal costs
and markups rise as private households supply more labor. As a consequence of
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the increase in markups, labor demand falls and in equilibrium, hours worked
may decline. In turn, output, consumption and investment fall.
In a NKM, however, the monetary authority can partially offset the negative
effects of uncertainty by reducing the nominal interest rate. It is most impor-
tantly this reason why many papers do not find strong effects of uncertainty
shocks on economic activity. A central bank that is aggressively counteracting
uncertainty shocks offsets the negative effects on output similarly to other ex-
ogenous shocks (Born and Pfeifer (2011)). Also Bachmann and Bayer (2011)
show that the endogenous feedback of nominal interest rates and nominal wages
mitigate the negative effects on output. When the monetary authority is con-
strained by the zero lower bound, the effects of uncertainty become much more
significant, as the central bank cannot perfectly respond to the shock. Similarly,
accounting for frictions in the banking sector affects the transmission mecha-
nism of monetary policy. When changes in the central bank’s policy rate are
not perfectly passed through to the private sector (by imposing monopolistic
competition in the retail banking sector and assuming sticky loan and deposit
rates), the offsetting power of the monetary authority is notably undermined.
The zero lower bound is a more extreme constraint on the monetary policy than
the imperfect pass-through. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the
zero lower bound is constraining under the circumstance of the policy interest
rate actually being close to zero. The amplification channel in this chapter
occurs also in "normal" times when the interest rate is far from the zero lower
bound.
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2.4 The model
We derive a medium-sized DSGE model based on Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali
et al. (2010) featuring a frictional banking sector. The economy is populated
by two types of agents: households and entrepreneurs. These are heterogeneous
in their time preferences, such that in equilibrium, households are net lenders
and entrepreneurs are net borrowers. Households maximize their discounted
lifetime utility by choosing consumption and labor. They deposit their savings
at commercial banks, which remunerate them with an interest rate rd. In ad-
dition, we assume that households own shares of the commercial banks and of
the final-good firms (i.e. retail firms).
Entrepreneurs own competitive firms that produce a homogeneous intermediate
good by mixing labor services, supplied by the households, and capital that they
purchase from capital producers. They sell the intermediate good to retailers,
who use it to produce the final consumption good. Entrepreneurs get loans from
the banks at a loan interest rate rb. Their ability to borrow is constrained by the
value of their stock of physical capital that is used as collateral. Entrepreneurs
are furthermore assumed to own the capital producing firms.
Capital-producing firms combine old undepreciated capital, acquired from the
entrepreneurs, and final goods, purchased from the retailers in order to fabricate
new capital. Transforming final goods into capital involves adjustment costs.
Capital-producing firms sell the new capital back to the entrepreneurs.
Similarly as in Bernanke et al. (1999), price stickiness is introduced at the final-
good firms level, with price adjustment costs á la Rotemberg (1982). These firms
operate in monopolistic competition. They acquire intermediate goods from
the entrepreneurs and produce differentiate final-consumption goods. These
differentiation is only marginal, e.g. different brands or different colors.
The model economy features a frictional banking sector. Commercial banks
conduct the financial intermediation activities. Each bank consists of two
branches: a competitive wholesale branch that manages the capital of the bank
and chooses the wholesale amount of deposits and loans; a retail branch that
lends resources to entrepreneurs and collects deposits of the households. The
retail branch operates in a monopolistically competitive environment and has
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therefore a certain degree of market power. It can therefore assert a relatively
high loan interest rate to the entrepreneurs and a low deposit interest rate to the
households with respect to the central bank interest rate, such that rd ≤ r ≤ rb.
A very important characteristic of the model is the assumption that banks pay
adjustment costs when changing the retail interest rates. The stickiness in the
retail interest rates determines an imperfect pass-through of the monetary pol-
icy rate.
The model accounts for two exogenous shocks: a TFP "level" shock, i.e. a
standard first-moment shock to technology, that enters the entrepreneur’s pro-
duction function; a TFP uncertainty shock, i.e. a second-moment shock to
technology that enters indirectly the solution of the model. In figure 2.2 we
depict the model economy.
Figure 2.2: The model economy
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2.4.1 Non-financial sector
We assume two different types of non-financial agents, i.e. households and en-
trepreneurs. Households are more patient than entrepreneurs and are therefore
characterized by a higher intertemporal discount factor (i.e. βh > βe). This de-
termines that in equilibrium households will be net lenders and entrepreneurs
net borrowers.
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Households
Each household i chooses consumption cht (i), labor lt(i) and savings to be de-
posited at the bank dt(i) in order to maximize its expected discounted lifetime
utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βth
[
log(cht (i))−
lt(i)1+φ
1 + φ
]
, (2.3)
where φ is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. Each representative
household maximizes its utility subject to its budget constraint:
cht (i) + dt(i) = wtlt(i) +
1 + rdt−1
(1 + pit)
dt−1(i) + JRt (i) + (1− ϕ)JBt (i). (2.4)
The expenditures of the current period consist of consumption and deposit
contracts. The income stream of the households is composed of wage income
(wtlt(i)), real interest payments resulting from last period’s deposits made at
the bank, deflated by the consumer price inflation ((1 + rdt−1)/(1 + pit)), profits
of the monopolistically competitive retail sector (JRt ) and a share (1 − ϕ) of
profits JBt from the monopolistically competitive banking sector which is paid
out as dividend.
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs own firms that produce a homogeneous intermediate good. Each
entrepreneur j maximizes her lifetime utility choosing consumption cet (j), bor-
rowing bt(j) and the stock of physical capital kt(j)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βte
[
log(cet (j))
]
, (2.5)
subject to:
cet (j) + wtlt(j) +
1 + rbt−1
(1 + pit)
bt−1(j) + qkt kt(j) =
yet (j)
xt
+ bt(j) + (1− δ)qkt kt−1(j),
where rb represents the loan rate, δ is the capital depreciation rate, and qkt
the real price of capital. Ultimately, 1/xt = PWt /Pt is the relative price of
the intermediate good, such that xt can be interpreted as the gross markup
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of the final good over the intermediate good. The firm uses a Cobb-Douglas
production function given by:
yet (j) = zt[kt−1(j)]αlt(j)1−α, (2.6)
where zt represents TFP and α is the share of capital employed in the produc-
tion process.
As previously mentioned, entrepreneurs are allowed to borrow an amount of re-
sources that is commensurate with the value of physical capital the entrepreneurs
own. Hence, they face a borrowing constraint á la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
that is given by:
(1 + rbt )bt(j) ≤ mEt[qkt+1(1 + pit+1)(1− δ)kt(j)], (2.7)
where the left-hand side is the amount to be repaid by the entrepreneur and the
right-hand side represents the value of the collateral. In particular m represents
the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.
Capital producers
Capital producing firms are introduced in order to obtain a price for capital that
is necessary to determine the value of the entrepreneur’s collateral. These firms
act in a perfectly competitive market and are owned by the entrepreneurs. They
purchase last period’s undepreciated capital (1− δ)kt−1 from the entrepreneurs
at a price Qkt and it units of final goods from retail firms and combine them
to produce new capital. In order to transform final goods into capital, these
firms face quadratic adjustment costs. The new capital is then sold back to
the entrepreneurs at the same price Qkt . The real price of capital is defined as
qkt ≡ Q
k
t
Pt
. Capital producers maximize then their expected discounted profits:
max
{kt,it}
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λe0,t
(
qkt ∆kt − it
)
, (2.8)
subject to:
kt = kt−1 +
1− κi2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2 it, (2.9)
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As stated above, entrepreneurs own the capital producing firms. These take
as given the entrepreneurs’ stochastic discount factor (i.e the intertemporal
marginal rate of susbtitution) Λe0,t ≡ βec
e
0
cet
. κi governs the magnitude of the ad-
justment costs associated with the transformation of the final good into capital.
2.4.2 Retailers
The retailing firms are modeled similarly as in Bernanke (1983). These firms
are owned by the households, they act in monopolistic competition and their
prices are sticky. They purchase the intermediate-good from entrepreneurs in a
competitive market, then slightly differentiate it, e.g. by adding a brand name,
at no additional cost. Let yt(ν) be the quantity of output sold by the retailer
ν, and Pt(ν) the associated price. The total amount of final good produced in
the economy:
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(ν)(
y−1)/ydν
]y/(y−1)
, (2.10)
with the associated price index:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(ν)(1−
y)dν
]1/(1−y)
. (2.11)
In (2.10) and (2.11), y represents the elasticity of substitution between dif-
ferentiated final goods. Given (2.10), the demand that each retailer faces is
equal to:
yt(ν) =
(
Pt(ν)
Pt
)−y
yt. (2.12)
Each firm ν chooses its price to maximize the expected discounted value of
profits subject to the demand for consumption goods (2.12):
max
{Pt(ν)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λh0,t
(Pt(ν)− PWt ) yt(ν)− kP2
(
Pt(ν)
Pt−1(ν)
− (1 + pi)
)2
Ptyt
 , (2.13)
It is assumed that firms take the households’ (that own the firms) stochastic dis-
count factor , Λh0,t ≡ βhc
h
0
cht
, as given. Prices are assumed to be indexed to steady
state inflation. The last term of the objective function represents quadratic
adjustment costs the retailer j faces whenever she wants to adjust her prices
beyond indexation (Rotemberg (1982)). As we have already mentioned PWt
represents the price of intermediate goods that the retailers take as given.
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2.4.3 Financial sector
The financial sector consists of commercial banks modeled similarly as in Gerali
et al. (2010). Households are the shareholders of these banks. These operate on
a wholesale level and on a retail level. The wholesale branch acts in a perfectly
competitive market, manages the total capital of the bank and is characterized
by the following balance sheet identity:
bt = dt + kbt , (2.14)
which can be graphically represented by:
Banks Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
bt k
b
t
dt
All bank assets consist of loans to firms bt, whereas liabilities consist of bank
capital (net worth) kbt , and wholesale deposits dt.
The retail branch of the bank operates in a monopolistically competitive market
and is composed by two divisions:
1. A loan-retail division, which is responsible for lending resources to the
entrepreneurs;
2. A deposit-retail division, which collects the deposits of the saving house-
holds.
The market power in this market is modeled in a Dixit-Stiglitz fashion. Every
loan (deposit) retail branch marginally differentiates the loan (deposit) contract.
All these contract are then assembled in a CES basket that is taken as given by
entrepreneurs and households. The demand for loans at bank n can be derived
by minimizing the total debt repayment of entrepreneur j:
min
bt(j,n)
∫ 1
0
rbt (n)bt(j, n)dn, (2.15)
subject to
b¯t(j) ≤
[∫ 1
0
bt(j, n)(
b−1)/bdn
]b/(b−1)
, (2.16)
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where b¯t is the amount of real loans sought by entrepreneur j and b is the
elasticity of substitution of loan contracts. The aggregate demand for loans at
bank n is then given by:
bt(n) =
(
rbt (n)
rbt
)−b
bt. (2.17)
The demand function bt(n) depends negatively (as b is assumed to be larger
than 1) on the loan interest rate rbt (n) that is set at the retail-division level, and
positively on the total amount of loans bt. The demand for deposits at bank n
can be derived similarly by maximizing the total revenue of savings accruing to
household i:
max
dt(i,n)
∫ 1
0
rdt (n)dt(i, n)dn (2.18)
subject to
d¯t(i) ≥
[∫ 1
0
dt(i, n)(
d−1)/ddn
]d/(d−1)
, (2.19)
where d¯t(i) is the amount of real deposits sought by household i and d is the
elasticity of substitution of deposit contracts. The aggregate demand for loans
at bank n is equal to:
dt(n) =
(
rdt (j)
rdt
)−d
dt. (2.20)
The demand function dt(n) depends positively both on the deposit rate rdt that
is set by the deposit retail-division, (since d is assumed to be smaller than 1)
and on the total volume of resources deposited in the bank dt.
Wholesale branch
As mentioned above, the wholesale banking market is perfectly competitive.
The wholesale branch of each bank maximizes the discounted sum of cash flows
by choosing wholesale loans and deposits, bt and dt, taking into account the
stochastic discount factor of the households Λh0,t:
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max
{bt,dt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λh0,t
[
(1+Rbt)bt−(1+pit+1)bt+1+dt+1−(1+Rdt )dt+(Kbt+1(1+pit+1)−kbt )
]
,
(2.21)
subject to the budget constraint:
bt = dt + kbt , (2.22)
and given the following law of motion for bank capital:
(1 + pit)kbt = (1− δb)kbt−1 + ϕJ bt−1. (2.23)
It is moreover assumed that banks can obtain unlimited funding from the central
bank at the policy rate rt. The no-arbitrage condition hence implies that the
wholesale deposit and loan rates coincide with rt:
Rbt = Rdt = rt. (2.24)
Retail branch
Retail banks, in both loan and deposit activities, operate in monopolistic compe-
tition and are therefore profit maximizers. Loan-retail divisions maximize their
expected discounted profits by choosing the interest rate on loans and facing
quadratic adjustment costs. These banks borrow liquidity from the wholesale
branch at rate Rbt (which as we previously showed is equal to the policy rate)
and lend it to the entrepreneurs at rate rbt (n). The optimization problem of the
loan-retail division of bank n is given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λh0,t
(rbt (n)− rt) bt(n)− κb2
(
rbt (n)
rbt−1(n)
− 1
)2
rbtbt
 , (2.25)
subject to the demand for loans (2.17).
Deposit-retail divisions maximize their profits by choosing the interest rate rdt
which they pay on households’ deposits. Their activity consists in collecting
the households’ deposits and lend those resources to the wholesale bank that
pays an interest rate Rdt (equal to rt) on them. The optimization problem of
the deposit division of bank n is:
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λh0,t
(rt − rdt (n)) dt(n)− κd2
(
rdt (n)
rdt−1(n)
− 1
)2
rdt dt
 , (2.26)
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where dt(n) are the wholesale deposits of bank n. The optimization problem is
constrained by the demand for deposits of the households (2.20).
2.4.4 Monetary Authority
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate following a conventional Taylor
type rule:
1 + rt
1 + r =
(1 + rt−1
1 + r
)φr (1 + pit
1 + pi
)φpi ( yt
yt−1
)φy(1−φr) , (2.27)
where φr is a smoothing parameter that captures the gradual movements in the
interest rate as in Clarida et al. (1999), r and pi are respectively the steady state
values of the policy rate and of inflation. φpi and φy represent the weights the
central bank gives to deviations of inflation from its steady state level and to
output growth.
2.4.5 Market clearing
Ultimately the model is closed by combining the first order conditions of all
agents to the clearing condition of the goods market:
yt = ct + [kt − (1− δ)kt−1] + δb k
b
t−1
(1 + pit)
+ ADJt, (2.28)
where ct ≡ cht +cet is aggregate consumption, kt is aggregate physical capital and
kbt , as mentioned before, represents aggregate bank capital. Ultimately ADJt
includes all real adjustment costs for prices and interest rates:
ADJt ≡ κp2 (pit)
2yt +
κd
2
(
rdt−1
rdt−2
− 1
)2
rdt−1dt−1 +
κb
2
(
rbt−1
rbt−2
− 1
)2
rbt−1bt−1. (2.29)
2.4.6 Shock processes
In order to model uncertainty shocks, we use the stochastic volatility approach
as proposed by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), assuming time varying volatil-
ity of the innovation to TFP. An uncertainty shock is a second-moment shock
that affects the shape of the distribution by widening the tails of the level
shock and keeping its mean unchanged. A level shock is a first-moment shock
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that varies the level of TFP, keeping its distribution unchanged. A graphical
comparison between the two types of shocks is shown in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Level and uncertainty shock
t=
0
Level Shock
t=
1
t=
2
t=
3
Uncertainty Shock
Notes: The left column represents a level shock to TFP. The right column represents a
second moment shock. We assume the shock to die out in period t = 3.
The red dotted line represents the level of TFP that increases after a positive
TFP level shock and returns to its initial level only after three periods. With
a positive uncertainty shock, instead, the level of TFP remains constant, while
its distribution becomes wider as the variance of the TFP shock increases. As
the effect of the shock dissipates, the distribution returns to its initial shape.
The stochastic volatility approach ensures that the dispersion of the level shocks
varies over time, such that there are sometimes large shocks and other times
less intensive ones. We consider an exogenous shock to the volatility of TFP,
that can also be interpreted as supply-side uncertainty. TFP follows an AR(1)
process with time-varying volatility of the innovations:
zt = (1− ρz)z + ρzzt−1 + σzt ezt . (2.30)
The coefficient ρz ∈ (−1, 1) determines the persistence of the TFP level shock.
The innovation to the TFP shock, ezt , follows an i.i.d. standard normal process.
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Furthermore the time-varying standard deviation of the innovations, σzt , follows
the stationary process:
σzt = (1− ρσz)σz + ρσzσzt−1 + ηzeσzt , where eσzt ∼ N (0, 1) (2.31)
in which ρσz determines the persistence of the uncertainty shock, σz is the
steady state value of σzt and ηz is the (constant) standard deviation of the TFP
uncertainty shock, eσzt .
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2.5 Macroeconomic effects of uncertainty
2.5.1 Solution and simulation method
The model is solved with the algorithm and software developed by Lan and
Meyer-Gohde (2011). Their solution method consists of a nonlinear moving
average perturbation technique that maps our nonlinear DSGE model:
Etf(xt+1, xt, xt−1, et) = 0, (2.32)
into a system of equations, known as policy function:
xt = h(σ, et, et−1, et−2, . . . ). (2.33)
In (2.32) and (2.33), xt and et represent the vectors of endogenous (control and
state) variables and exogenous shocks. σ ∈ [0, 1] denotes a scaling parameter
for the distribution of the stochastic shocks et, such that σ = 1 corresponds to
the original stochastic model (2.32), and σ = 0 to the non-stochastic case. The
basic idea behind this solution method is to approximate the policy function
with Volterra series expansion around the deterministic steady state:
xt =
J∑
j=0
1
j!
j∏
l=1
∞∑
il=0
(J−j∑
n=0
1
n!xσ
ni1i2...ijσ
n
)
(et−i1 ⊗ et−i2 ⊗ et−i3 ...). (2.34)
This Volterra series directly maps the exogenous innovations to the endogenous
variables. As noted by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), with a first order
approximation, shocks only enter with their first moments. The first moments
of future shocks in turn drop out when taking expectations of the linearized
equations. This determines the property of certainty equivalence, i.e. agents
completely disregard of the uncertainty associated with Et[et+1]. This property
makes the first order approximation not suitable for the analysis of second
moment shocks. In a second order approximation there are effects of volatility
shocks that enter as cross-products with the other state variables (Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2011)). This order of approximation is therefore not sufficient
to isolate the effects of uncertainty from those of the level shock. As we are
interested in analyzing the effects of uncertainty shocks, keeping the the first
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moment shocks shut off, it is necessary to approximate (2.33) up to a third
order:
xt =x¯+
1
2yσ
2 + 12
∞∑
i=0
(xi + xσ2,i)et−i +
1
2
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
i=0
xj,i(et−j ⊗ et−i)
+ 16
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
j=0
∞∑
i=0
xk,j,i(et−k ⊗ et−j ⊗ et−i). (2.35)
A common problem when simulating time series with higher-order approximated
solutions is that it often leads to explosive paths for xt. A common solution,
suggested by Kim et al. (2008), is that of "pruning" out the unstable higher-order
terms. Nevertheless with the algorithm we have adopted (Lan and Meyer-Gohde
(2013)) the stability from the first order solution is passed on to all higher order
recursions, and no pruning is hence required.
2.5.2 Calibration
We calibrate the benchmark model on a quarterly basis for the euro area and set
the parameter values according to stylized facts and to previous findings in the
literature. The calibrated structural parameters of the model are illustrated in
table (2.1). The discount factor for households is set to 0.9943 which results into
a steady state interest rate on deposits of approximately 2 percent, while we set
the loan rate for entrepreneurs to 0.975 as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The
inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity is set to 1.0, in line with Christiano
et al. (2013). We set the depreciation rate of capital δ to 0.025 and the share of
capital in the production process α to 0.25. In the goods market we assume a
markup of 20 percent and set y to 6, a value frequently used in the literature.
According to the posterior estimates of Gerali et al. (2010), we calibrate the
paramater for the investment adjustment costs κi to 10.2 and the one for the
price adjustment costs κp to 30.
Regarding the parameters for the banking sector, we base our calibration on
Gerali et al. (2010). We set the loan-to-value ratio for entrepreneurs m to 0.35,
the elasticities of substitution of the deposit (loan) rate to -1.46 (3.12) which
implies a markdown (markup) on the deposit (loan) rate of about 1.6 (2.0)
percentage points, values that are in line with statistical evidence of interest
rate spreads in the euro area. In addition, bank management costs δb are set
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to 0.0105. Banks retain half of their profits in order to cover bank management
costs. For this reason we set ϕ equal to 0.5. Furthermore, we set the loan
rate adjustment costs κb to 9.5 and the deposit rate adjustment costs κd to 3.5,
consistent with the estimation results of Gerali et al. (2010).
We assume the central bank to react aggressively to inflation by setting the
parameter φpi to 2.0, while it responds only marginally to changes in output
growth (φy = 0.3). Additionally, we include interest rate smoothing with a
smoothing parameter ρr equal to 0.75.
The uncertainty shock to TFP is calibrated according to the empirical evi-
dence in the euro area. We set the volatility of the second moment TFP shock
ηz to 15 percent, which is in line with the implied volatility index VSTOXX.
The other parameters related to the shock processes are calibrated similarly to
Basu and Bundick (2012). The persistence parameters of the first moment TFP
shock ρz is equal to 0.9. The persistence parameter of the second moment shock
ρσz is equal to 0.83.
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Table 2.1: Deep parameters of the benchmark model
Parameter Value Description
Non-financial sector
βh 0.9943 Discount factor private households (savers)
βe 0.975 Discount factor entrepreneurs (borrowers)
φ 1 Inverse of Frisch labor supply elasticity
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate of physical capital
α 0.25 Weight of capital in aggregate production function
y 6 Elasticity of substitution in the goods market
κi 10.2 Investment adjustment costs
κp 30 Price adjustment costs (Rotemberg)
m 0.35 Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for the entrepreneurs
Financial sector
d -1.46 Elasticity of substitution for deposits
b 3.12 Elasticity of substitution for loans
ϕ 0.5 Share of banks’ retained earnings
δb 0.1 Bank management costs
κb 9.5 Loan rate adjustment costs
κd 3.5 Deposit rate adjustment costs
Monetary Policy
φy 0.30 Weight on output in Taylor rule
φpi 2.0 Weight on inflation in Taylor rule
ρr 0.75 Interest rate smoothing parameter
Shocks
z 1 Steady state of TFP
σz 0.01 Steady state volatility of TFP first moment shock
ρz 0.9 Persistence parameter of TFP first moment shock
ρσz 0.83 Persistence parameter of TFP second moment shock
ηz 0.0015 Volatility of TFP second moment shock
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2.5.3 Results
In the following we analyze the effects of an uncertainty shock to TFP on
main macroeconomic aggregates using impulse response functions. The aim
is to assess the importance of financial frictions and financial intermediation
in response to increases in uncertainty. Therefore, we compare three different
specifications of our model. Starting with our benchmark model which we
derived in section 2.4, we successively switch off the frictions in the banking
sector and reduce the model finally to one that closely resembles a standard
New Keynesian model.
The benchmark model (henceforth BM) includes a variety of financial fric-
tions, such as borrowing constraints on entrepreneurs, monopolistic competition
in the banking sector, and sticky loan and deposit rates. Starting from the BM,
we switch off the stickiness of loan and deposit rates, such that the retail rates
immediately respond to changes in the policy rate. However, we keep monop-
olistic competition in the banking sector such that there still is a markdown
to the deposit rate and a markup to the loan rate. We denote this model as
the flexible rate model (FRM). Finally, we switch off the entire banking sector
and the borrowing constraints of the entrepreneurs. This model specification
comes closest to a standard New Keynesian model which does not include any
financial frictions. We refer to this model as Quasi New Keynesian model.7
TFP uncertainty
Figure 2.4 plots the impulse response functions of a one-standard deviation
shock to TFP uncertainty for all three models. We consider the Quasi New
Keynesian model (blue dashed-dotted line); the Flexible Rate model (black
dashed line); and the benchmark model featuring all financial frictions (red
solid line). Consistently with the literature, we find that a one-standard de-
viation increase in TFP uncertainty has dampening effects on macroeconomic
aggregates. As in Basu and Bundick (2012) we find that output, consumption
and investment co-move negatively under sticky prices, while this is generally
not the case under flexible prices.8 When prices do not immediately adjust to
7We call the model Quasi New Keynesian since it has the main characteristics of a NKM
but additionally incorporates heterogenous agents.
8Under flexible prices, agents reduce consumption due to precautionary motives while
they increase their labor supply which boosts output; in a closed economy this leads to an
increase in investment.
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changing marginal costs, the increase in markups of the final good firms leads
to a fall in the demand for the intermediate good. This in turn determines the
intermediate good firm to reduce their labor input. Hence, aggregate output
falls and so does investment. This effect can be seen in the impulse responses
of the QNKM.
Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to a shock in TFP uncertainty
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Notes: Red solid line: Benchmark model (BM); Black dashed line: Model with flexible rates
(FRM); Blue dashed-dotted line: Quasi New Keynesian model (QNKM). All variables are
expressed in percentage deviations from steady state, except interest rates which are expressed
in annualized absolute deviations from steady state in basis points and the inflation rate which
is expressed as the annualized absolute deviation from steady state in percentage points.
The negative shock is partly offset by the central bank by reducing the nom-
inal interest rate. This becomes more evident when we compare the QNKM
and the FRM to the BM. Including a frictional banking sector with sticky re-
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tail rates reduces the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy. Due to an increase in TFP uncertainty, which can be interpreted as a
higher dispersion future costs for the intermediate firm, marginal costs increase
on impact and so does inflation. The central bank responds initially with an
increase in the policy rate which leads the loan and deposit to rise. As the
effect on marginal costs gets weaker after one quarter, inflation drops and the
central bank lowers the interest rate. However, the loan and deposit rate, which
are directly relevant for the non-financial sector in the BM, do not immediately
follow the change in the policy rate, but slowly adjust to it as they are assumed
to be sticky (Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: Response of policy and retail interest rates to an uncertainty shock
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Notes: The illustrated scenario is a response to a 150 percent shock in TFP uncertainty.
In the FRM retail rates immediately respond to the change in the policy
rate and for this reason the uncertainty shock is not amplified compared to the
QNKM.
The result of including a frictional financial sector is that macroeconomic aggre-
gates react stronger to the TFP uncertainty shock. Output and consumption
fall about three times as strong as in the QNKM and investment about four
times. However, the overall effects of TFP uncertainty are small. This result
is consistent with previous studies, such as Born and Pfeifer (2011), Bachmann
and Bayer (2011), and Basu and Bundick (2012). This is basically because of
two effects. First, the parameter of the Frisch labor supply elasticity is set to
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a value that is relatively low such that household immediately react to shock
and adjust their labor supply. Second, the aggressive and quick response of
the central bank to offset the negative shock mitigates the potential effects of
uncertainty. The small effects become even more evident when comparing the
effects of the uncertainty shock to a shock in the level of TFP. While output
only declines 0.02 percent after a standard deviation TFP uncertainty shock it
declines by about 1 percent after a negative standard deviation TFP level shock
(see Figure A1 in the appendix).
The outcomes of our model are qualitatively in line with the empirical findings
in section 2.2.2. However, the magnitude of the responses of macroeconomic
aggregate in the data indicates that uncertainty shocks have a stronger effect
in the euro area than predicted by our model.
2.5.4 Reconciling the model with the data
One possible explanation for the strong effects of uncertainty from the BVAR
is that the global financial crisis is included in our data sample. During 2007-
2009 uncertainty increased sharply and macroeconomic aggregates plummeted
strongly. Empirical analysis from other studies indicate that non-linearities are
an important driver to explain the strong amplification of financial markets
shocks on the economy. While there tend to be small effects of uncertainty and
financial shocks in a "normal" macroeconomic environment, the effects of uncer-
tainty are high in a distressed regime (van Roye (2011), Aboura and van Roye
(2013) and Hubrich and Tetlow (2012)). In this subsection we show that in pe-
riods of recession, the impact of uncertainty of shocks on economic fluctuations
is considerably higher and closer to the empirical findings.
To simulate a distressed scenario, we simultaneously hit the economy with a
negative two standard deviations TFP level shock and one standard deviation
uncertainty shock. Afterward, we subtract the effect of the TFP shock from that
of the combined shock. The outcome is the isolated effect of the uncertainty
shock. Figure 2.6 shows the different impact of the uncertainty shock on main
macroeconomic aggregates under two scenarios: the baseline case, as in figure
2.4, and in times of strong economic downturn, as described above.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to an uncertainty shock in a normal regime and
in a distressed regime.
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Notes: The blue solid line represents the IRF to an uncertainty shock in the baseline
case; the red dashed-dotted line represents the IRF to an uncertainty shock during a strong
economic downturn.
The effects of the uncertainty shocks are significantly stronger in the dis-
tressed scenario. This exercise emphasizes the importance of non-linearities
and potential regime dependencies, when analyzing uncertainty shocks.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we present a framework to analyze the impact of uncertainty
shocks on macroeconomic aggregates under financial frictions. In particular,
we include a banking sector that operates in a monopolistically competitive en-
vironment and sticky retail rates in a DSGE model with heterogenous agents.
We depart from the strand of literature that analyzes uncertainty shocks under
financial frictions on the credit demand side by focusing on frictions on the
credit supply side. This seems to be a very important channel through which
uncertainty shocks transmit to the real economy. In fact, we show that these
features amplify significantly the effects of uncertainty shocks. This finding is
mainly due to a reduction in the effectiveness in the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. A possible extension of our analysis could be to include uncer-
tainty in the financial sector. Moreover, a regime-switching DSGE model could
be an appropriate extension to shed light on non-linear effects of uncertainty
shocks. We leave both to future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Complete model equations
First order conditions of the households
Households’ Euler equation
1
cht
= βEt
[
1
cht+1
(1 + rdt )
(1 + pit+1)
]
, (2.36)
Labor supply equation
lφt = wt
1
cht
, (2.37)
Households’ budget constraint
cht + dt = wtlt + (1 + rdt−1)
dt−1
(1 + pit)
+ JRt , (2.38)
First order conditions entrepreneurs
stm¯Et(1 + pit+1)(1− δk) + βeEt
[(
1
cet+1
)(
(1− δk) + rkt+1
)]
= 1
cet
, (2.39)
Wage equation
wt = (1− α) y
e
t
ltxt
, (2.40)
Euler equation entrepreneurs
1
cet
− st(1 + rbt ) = βeEt
[
1
cet+1
(1 + rbt )
(1 + pit+1)
]
, (2.41)
Budget constraint entrepreneurs
cet +
(
(1 + rbt−1)bt−1
1 + pit
)
+ wtlt + qkt kt =
yet
xt
+ bt + qkt (1− δ)kt−1, (2.42)
Production function
yet = zt (kt−1)
α l1−αt , (2.43)
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Borrowing constraint
(1 + rbt )bt = mEt
[
qkt+1(1 + pit+1)kt(1− δ)
]
, (2.44)
Capital producers
Return on capital
rkt =
αat (kt−1)α−1 l1−αt
xt
, (2.45)
Capital equation
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 +
1− κi2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2 it, (2.46)
Banks
Rbt = Rdt = rt, (2.47)
kbt (1 + pit) = (1− δb)kbt−1 + ϕJ bt−1, (2.48)
bt = dt + kbt , (2.49)
Markup and markdown equations
Markdown on deposits
− 1 + 
d
t
(dt − 1)
− 
d
t
(dt − 1)
rt
rdt
− κd
(
rdt
rdt−1
− 1
)
rdt
rdt−1
(2.50)
+ βhEt
[
cht
cht+1
κd
(
rdt+1
rdt
− 1
)(
rdt+1
rdt
)2
dt+1
dt
]
= 0,
Markup on loans
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1− 
b
(b − 1) +
b
(b − 1)
Rbt
rbt
− κb
(
rbt
rbt−1
− 1
)
rbt
rbt−1
(2.51)
+ βhEt
[
cht
cht+1
κb
(
rbt+1
rbt
− 1
)(
rbt+1
rbt
)2
bEt+1
bt
]
= 0,
Bank profits
J bt = rbtbt − rdt dt −
κd
2
(
rdt
rdt−1
− 1
)2
rdt dt (2.52)
− κb2
(
rbt
rbt−1
− 1
)2
rbtbt,
Retailers
JRt = yt
(
1− 1
xt
− κp2 pi
2
t
)
, (2.53)
Nonlinear Phillips curve
1− yt +
yt
xt
− κppit(1 + pit) (2.54)
+ βhEt
[
cht
cht+1
κppit+1(1 + pit+1)
yt+1
yt
]
= 0,
Aggregation and Equilibrium
ct = cht + cet , (2.55)
yt = ct + [kt − (1− δ)kt−1] + δbk
b
t−1
pit
+ ADJt, (2.56)
Taylor Rule and Profits CB
1 + rt
1 + r =
(1 + rt−1
1 + r
)φr (1 + pit
1 + pi
)φpi ( yt
yt−1
)φy(1−φr) , (2.57)
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Exogenous Processes
TFP level shock
zt = (1− ρz)z + ρzzt−1 + σzt ezt , (2.58)
TFP uncertainty shock
σzt = (1− ρσz)σz + ρσzσzt−1 + ηzeσzt , where eσzt ∼ N (0, 1) (2.59)
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A.2 Impulse responses to level shocks
Figure A1: Impulse response functions to a shock in the level of TFP
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A.3 Details on data used in estimation
Below we describe the data we use in the empirical exercise in section 2.3.
Uncertainty index We use both the implied volatility index VSTOXX pro-
vided by Thomson Financial Datastream and the the Eurostoxx50 which we
use to approximate a historical volatility index prior to 1999. For this proxy
we use a standard GARCH(1,1) model using monthly data and build 3-month
averages over this index. Source: Thomson Financial Datastream.
Real GDP We use the time series YER provided by the AWM database origi-
nally provided by Fagan et al. (2001) and take log-differences of this index. For
data after 2011Q4 we use the log-differences of the real GDP index provided by
Eurostat. Source: AWM database and Eurostat.
Investment We use the time series ITR provided by the AWM database orig-
inally provided by Fagan et al. (2001) and take log-differences of this index. For
data after 2011Q4 we use the log-differences of the real GDP index provided by
Eurostat. Source: AWM database and Eurostat.
Consumption We use the time series PCR provided by the AWM database
originally provided by Fagan et al. (2001) and take log-differences of this index.
For data after 2011Q4 we use the log-differences of the real GDP index provided
by Eurostat. Source: AWM database and Eurostat.
Loan rate Interest rate charged by monetary financial institutions (excluding
Eurosystem) for loans to non-financial corporations (outstanding amounts, all
maturities), in percent (ECB). Source: ECB and Thomson financial datastream
(Code: EMBANKLPB).
Interest rate We use the 3-month average of the unsecured Euro interbank
offered rate (Euribor). Source: Thomson Financial Datastream (Code: EM-
INTER3)
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Figure A2: Variables used in estimation
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CHAPTER3
Financial stress and economic activity in
Germany1
3.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 showed that strongly increasing financial stress
may have dramatic effects on the economy. The collapse of Lehman Brothers
led to a full-blown systemic crisis triggering the sharpest and severest downturn
in economic activity in industrialized countries since the Great Depression. In
the euro area, this crisis was exacerbated by a sovereign debt crisis, which
was accompanied by a systemic crisis in the euro area banking system. Beside
these very recent events, there is further empirical and theoretical evidence that
financial stress may cause severe financial crises and recessions in general (Borio
and Lowe (2002), Borio and Drehmann (2009), and Bloom (2009)). Against this
background, it is a crucial challenge to monitor and to detect potential signs of
financial stress for the conduct of economic policy.
Until the outbreak of the financial crisis, monetary and financial factors were
only peripherally integrated into standard macroeconomic models. In particu-
lar, these models did not include financial market variables, such as stock market
volatility, capital market spreads, and variables indicating imbalances on inter-
bank markets. As a consequence, these models significantly underestimated the
scope and persistence of the financial crisis. One major challenge is to include
these financial market variables as real-time indicators into these models to bet-
ter assess the macro-financial interdependence. These indicators may allow an
early identification of a financial turmoil and may be able to guide decision mak-
1This chapter is based on the paper van Roye (2013). Financial stress and economic
activity in Germany. Empirica, DOI: 10.1007/s10663-013-9224-0, Springer, US.
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ers to tighten or loosen monetary or macroprudential policies even if inflation
remains subdued (Borio (2011a), Borio (2011b), and Goodhart (2011)).
Monitoring the state of financial stability has also become an increasingly
important task for central banks and international organisations. In practice,
the European Central Bank (ECB) has developed indicators that are aimed
to "measure the current state of instability, i.e. the current level of frictions,
stresses and strains in the financial system" (European Central Bank (2011)).
The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis established the so-called KCFSI and STLFSI Indexes (Hakkio and
Keeton (2009) and Kliesen and Smith (2010) in order to establish a single and
comprehensive index measuring financial stress for conducting future monetary
policy. International institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have also developed indexes
as an early warning tool for increases in financial stress.
Illing and Liu (2006) were among the first to use a principal components
analysis calculating a financial stress index. They use a static factor model for
Canada and show that their index provides an ordinal measures for stress in
the financial system. Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Kliesen and Smith (2010)
use a similar approach to calculate the so-called KCFSI and STLFSI indexes
for the U.S. economy, which are used by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In a subsequent article, Davig
and Hakkio (2010) analyze the effects of financial stress on economic activity
using the KCFSI. They find that the U.S. economy fluctuates between a nor-
mal regime, in which financial stress is low and economic activity is high, and
a distressed regime, in which financial stress is high and economic activity is
low. Hatzius et al. (2010) calculate an alternative financial stress index using
45 variables to explore the link between financial conditions and economic ac-
tivity in the United States and show that during most of the past two decades,
including the five years leading up to the crisis, the index can explain the path
of future economic activity better than other existing indexes. Their major
innovation is that they estimate an unbalanced panel, which makes it possible
to calculate the index back to 1970. Ng (2011) examines the predictive power
of the indexes developed by Hatzius et al. (2010), and two indexes developed
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by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. He comes to the conclusion
that using financial stress indexes as additional predictors improves forecasting
accuracy of United States GDP growth at horizons from 2 to 4 quarters. Bloom
(2009) takes a somewhat different approach to exploring the link between finan-
cial stress and economic activity in the United States by analyzing the impact
of uncertainty shocks, measured by the volatility index (VIX) of the S&P500,
on industrial production. He uses a vector autoregressive model (VAR) and
finds the stock market volatility affects industrial production significantly and
persistently.2
Holló et al. (2012) develop a composite indicator of systemic stress (CISS)
which is thought to measure the current state of financial stability in the euro
area. They employ a threshold bivariate VAR model including the CISS and
industrial production. They show that the effects of financial stress depends on
the regime, i.e. while the impact of financial stress on economic activity in a
low-stress regime is insignificant, the impact in a high stress regimes noticeably
dampens economic activity after the shock. Mallick and Sousa (2011) use a
financial stress index in a Bayesian VAR and a sign-restriction VAR model to
examine the real effects of financial stress. They find that unexpected variation
in financial stress leads to significant variations in output. Grimaldi (2010)
derives a financial stress index for the euro area and studies its ability to detect
periods of financial stress. She finds that the index is able to extract information
from an otherwise noisy signal and that it can provide richer information than
simple measures of volatility. Finally, Afonso et al. (2011) analyze the impact
of financial stress and fiscal developments in a threshold VAR model for several
countries. Using the FSI developed by the IMF, they find that high financial
stress significantly reduces output.
There are also several articles in the recent literature that deal with various
comparable financial stress indexes that can be used across countries. These
indexes have been used recently by the IMF to improve the assessment of eco-
nomic activity in the World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund
(2011)). Matheson (2011), for example, developed the indexes for the United
States and the euro area and Unsal et al. (2011) developed indexes for several
2In fact, Bloom (2009) does not use a financial stress index, but instead uses the S&P
stock market volatility, which he interprets as a measure of market uncertainty.
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Asian countries and Australia. Cardarelli et al. (2011) use an augmented in-
dex including more variables from the banking sector and examine why some
financial stress periods lead to a downswing in economic activity in 17 advanced
economies over the past 30 years. They find that financial stress often but not
always precedes a recession.
This chapter contributes to the recent literature in several ways. First, I esti-
mate a financial stress index (FSI) for Germany using a dynamic approximate
factor model. I use a broad measure of financial stress considering financial vari-
ables from the banking sector that proved to be relevant when explaining the
sharp downturn during the financial crisis, financial variables from the capital
market, and a financial variable from the foreign exchange market. As Brave
and Butters (2011), I estimate an unbalanced panel in order to apply a long
data sample and to account for the issue of ragged data edges due to publication
lags. Against this background, I allow for an estimation of an arbitrary pattern
of missing data as in Banbura and Modugno (2012). Subsequently, I estimate a
small threshold VAR model in order to analyze the effects of financial stress on
economic activity. I show that nonlinear effects play a crucial role in explaining
the sharp downturn during the recent financial crisis.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I estimate the FSI for
Germany, applying a dynamic approximate factor model. Using the FSI, events
of high and low financial stress in German history are identified. In addition,
the FSI is compared to alternative indexes for the United States and Germany.
After having presented the TVAR model and threshold tests in Section 3.3, I
show the results of an impulse response analysis for a one-regime linear VAR, a
two-regime linear VAR and nonlinear impulse responses. In section 3.4 I briefly
present conclusions.
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3.2 The Financial Stress Index (FSI)
3.2.1 Methodology
In general, financial stress is unobservable and it is not straightforward to mea-
sure it. One possible approach to proxy financial stress is to construct one single
index that serves as a proxy for the financial systems ability to intermediate.
Alternatively, this single index can be interpreted as the state of financial stabil-
ity and therefore as a thermometer of the financial system. Since financial stress
is presumably reflected in various financial market variables, I use a multitude
of financial market variables. The index consists of variables that are included
with both first and second moments. Variables that enter the index in first
moments (e.g. spreads) reflect the state of investors risk perception. Higher
risk perception leads to increasing spreads and therefore exacerbates funding
conditions for certain market participants. Financial variables that enter the
index with its second moments (e.g. volatility measures) reflect the state of
uncertainty on financial markets. High uncertainty may lead to a downturn in
economic activity due to precautionary savings, real option effects or Hartman-
Abel effects (Bernanke (1983), Abel (1983) and Hartman (1972)). In order to
identify which market segment is primarily under strain, I build three subgroups
that independently contribute to the financial stress index. In the following, I
distinguish between the banking sector as a financial intermediary, the capital
market as a funding source and the foreign exchange market as stress which is
related to the currency (Figure 3.1).
I follow a similar methodology as Doz et al. (2011), Brave and Butters (2011),
and Banbura and Modugno (2012) and use a dynamic approximate factor model
combined with the Expectations Maximization (EM) algorithm. This method-
ology has the advantage that it allows for treating ragged data edges due to
publication lags.3 In addition, this methodology allows for estimating unbal-
anced panel data and mixed frequencies. This is particularly important in the
construction of a financial stress index, since many financial variables are not
available until very recently and the data frequency of financial data is usually
not homogeneous.
3Therefore, this methodology is quite prominent in the forecasting literature (see Stock
and Watson (2002), Giannone et al. (2008) and Doz et al. (2011)).
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual construction of the FSI
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Dynamic Approximate Factor Model
The model can be written in state space form. The measurement equation
relates the observed data to the state vector of the latent factor ft.4
yt = Λft + εt, where εt ∼ iid N (0, C) (3.1)
where yt is a vector of stationary and standardized endogenous financial vari-
ables, ft is a a single common latent factor, and Λ is a n× 1 vector of the time
series’ factor loadings. The values in the factor loading vector represent the
extent to which each financial variable time series is affected by the common
factor. The financial stress index is then given by FSIt = ft. The n×1 vector εt
represents the idiosyncratic component which is allowed to be slightly correlated
both serially at all leads and lags and cross-sectionally. This ensures that the
idiosyncratic component is not too restrictive in the case of large cross-sections
(Stock and Watson (2002)). The dynamics of the latent factor ft are described
in the transition equation, i.e.:
ft = Aft−1 + ξt, where ξt ∼ iid N (0, D) (3.2)
where A is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients, capturing the development
of the latent factor ft in an autoregressive model over time.
4I assume that a single factor reflects "financial stress". Including more factors does not
significantly change the outcome. Results are available upon request.
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Estimation
In order to estimate the unbalanced panel, I use the EM algorithm, originally
proposed by Dempster et al. (1977). This iterative procedure allows for an
efficient estimation to compute the maximum likelihood when data is missing
or hidden. In general, the EM algorithm consists of two steps: in the estima-
tion step, missing data are estimated using observed data by means of current
parameter estimates and the conditional expectation. Subsequently, under the
assumption that the data are known, the likelihood is maximized in the max-
imization step. The EM algorithm ensures convergence since at each iteration
the likelihood is increasing. In particular, in the Expectation step the expec-
tation of the log-likelihood conditional on the data is compute using estimates
from the prior iteration θ(i), i.e.
L(θ, θ(i)) = Eθ(i)[l(Y, F ; θ)|ΩT ]
The parameters are subsequently re-estimated through a log-likelihood-maximization
with respect to θ:
θ(i+ 1) = argEθ(i)[l(Y, F ; θ)|ΩT ] (3.3)
In the following, I base the estimation methodology on Banbura and Modugno
(2012). The parameter set consists of θ = {Λ, A, C,D}. Maximization of
equation (3.3) leads to the iteration processes of the factor loading matrix Λ
and the matrix A of autoregressive coefficient in the dynamic factor equation
(3.2):
Λ(i+ 1) =
[
T∑
t=1
Eθ(i)[ytf ′t |ΩT ]
][
T∑
t=1
Eθ(i)[ftf ′t |ΩT ]
]−1
(3.4)
and
A(i+ 1) =
[
T∑
t=1
Eθ(i)[ftf ′t |ΩT ]
][
T∑
t=1
Eθ(i)[ft−1f ′t−1|ΩT ]
]−1
(3.5)
which is similar to an ordinary least squares estimation of the log-likelihood
for complete data sets with the difference that for missing data, expectation
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terms are introduced. The iteration processes for the covariance matrices are
computed as follows:
C(i+ 1) = diag
[
1
T
(
T∑
t=1
Eθ(i)[yty′t|ΩT ]− Λ(i+ 1)
T∑
t=1
Eθ(i)[fty′t|ΩT ]
)]
(3.6)
and
D(i+ 1) = 1
T
[
T∑
t=1
Eθ(i)[ftf ′t |ΩT ]− A(i+ 1)
T∑
t=1
Eθ(i)[ft−1f ′t |ΩT ]
]
(3.7)
To calculate the moments of the unobservable factors, the data is passed through
the Kalman smoother.
Given that the data sample is incomplete, a diagonal selection matrix W has
to be used, in order to further develop the factor loading matrix from equation
(3.4):
vec(Λ(i+ 1)) =
[
T∑
t=1
Eθ(i)[ftf ′t |ΩT ]⊗Wt
]−1
vec
[
T∑
t=1
WtytEθ(i)[f ′t |ΩT ]
]
(3.8)
Similarly, equation (3.6) evolves as follows:
C(i+ 1) = diag
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
Wtyty
′
tW
′
t −WtytEθ(i)[f ′t |ΩT ]Λ(i+ 1)′Wt
−WtΛ(i+ 1)Eθ(i)[ft|ΩT ]y′tWt +WtΛ(i+ 1)Eθ(i)[ftf ′t |ΩT ]Λ(i+ 1)′Wt
+ (I −Wt)C(i+ 1)(I −Wt)
)]
(3.9)
I estimate the model using monthly data over a sample period from February
1970 until December 2012. I transform the quarterly data series to monthly
data by imposing restrictions on the factor loadings.5 For daily series, I use
monthly averages. Many time series are not available over the whole sample
5The only quarterly variable in the data sample is expected bank lending from the Bank
Lending Survey. For this variable, I construct a partially observed monthly counterpart as in
Mariano and Murasawa (2003) and Banbura and Modugno (2012).
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period. Yet, according to the methodology, the FSI can be estimated when
some data are still missing because of publication lags and missing past values.
3.2.2 Data and the FSI
I have collected data from various sources. As mentioned above, the financial
variables for the estimation can be summarized into three different subgroups,
i.e. the banking sector, the capital market and the foreign exchange market.
The first group contains variables related to the banking sector. These include
the TED spread, the money market spread (Euribor over Eurepo), the β of the
banking sector (a measure of bank return volatility relative to overall volatility
calculated with the standard capital-asset pricing model), an indicator for a
risk premium on bank equity, the spread on bank securities, lending conditions
expected by German banks surveyed by the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey, the
availability of credit to firms as surveyed by the ifo Institute, credit default swaps
on financial corporations, and an indicator of excess liquidity that is based
on Germany’s contribution to the ECB’s deposit facility. The second group
contains variables related to the capital market. These include a corporate
bond and a corporate loan spread, credit default swaps on DAX30 non-financial
corporations, annual stock market returns, implied and historical volatility of
the DAX (VDAX/HVDAX), the term spread, the correlation of the fixed income
market and the stock market (REX and DAX), and a housing loan spread.
Finally, the third group contains a variable related to the foreign exchange
market. In this case, I use a GARCH(1,1) model as a proxy for real effective
exchange rate volatility. More details on data sources and data construction
can be found in the appendix of this chapter.
The evolution of the FSI is shown in Figure 3.2. Several major events in Ger-
man economic history can be identified when analyzing the time pattern of
index. The first significant increase of financial stress occurred during the oil
crisis in 1973/1974. In particular, high inflation rates due to increasing com-
modity prices led to high volatilities on the foreign exchange market. After
about a decade of a calm financial environment, financial stress peaked dur-
ing the 1982 recession when commodity prices had been strongly increasing
once again. From 1982 until 1987 stock markets rallied all over the world and
the financial environment in Germany seemed to be extremely favorable and
calm. However, in 1987 the global stock market crash hit also the German
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Figure 3.2: Financial stress index for Germany
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Notes: The index is calculated on a basis of 18 financial market variables using a dynamic
approximate factor model.
stock market like a shock wave. On October 19, 1987, also referred to as Black
Monday, the DAX 30 dropped by 9.4 percent. Also other market segments
were strongly affected by this event such that financial stress increased signif-
icantly. While financial stress only rose slightly during German reunification
at the beginning of the 1990’s, it peaked again during the 1992/1993 Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis, when many currencies in the European Mone-
tary System came under pressure and several countries finally had to abandon
their currency peg to the Deutschmark. After the ERM crisis had been abated,
financial stress persistently declined and returns on stock markets in Germany
sharply increased. This stock market rally suddenly stopped with the insol-
vency of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) during the
Asian and the Russian currency crisis. As a consequence, financial stress rose
appreciable, but remained at lower levels than it was in the crises before. After
a very calm financial environment during the establishment of the European
Monetary Union, the terror attacks in the United States in September 2011
led to widespread financial stress in Germany. Stress stayed persistently high
during the following years since financial markets were still coping with the
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legacy of the dotcom bubble. Financial stress peaked again with the insol-
vency of WorldCom in 2002. The period after the burst of the dotcom bubble
was characterized by a very profitable environment for financial corporations.
Financial conditions were extremely favorable and financial innovations led to
high returns on bank equities. This period of very calm financial stress was
dramatically interrupted with the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008. The
collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered the strongest increase of financial stress
over the observation period. Almost all financial variables indicating financial
stress soared dramatically in all market segments. After a short drop in finan-
cial stress, it sharply rose again with the financial market turmoil associated
with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. The announcement of the ECB
to buy government bonds of selected European countries if necessary, led to a
strong decrease in financial stress in the second half of 2012.
Figure 3.3: Contribution of indicator groups
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Decomposing the FSI in its three subgroups allows for tracking the source of
financial stress in different periods (Figure 3.3). First, high real exchange rate
volatility was the primary source of financial stress during the oil crisis (par-
ticularly because of high inflation volatility) and the ERM crisis. In contrast,
very stable exchange rates contributed appreciably to the low stress environ-
ment from 1995 until the Russian currency crisis and the period in the run up
to the financial crisis. Second, high financial stress was mainly driven by capital
market variables during the 1987 stock market crash (in particular stock market
volatility and sharply decreasing stock returns), and the recent financial crisis
and the European sovereign debt crisis. Third, the German banking sector was
a source of financial stress particularly during the recent financial crisis, the
European sovereign debt crisis but also to a smaller extent during the 1982
recession.
3.2.3 Comparison with other indexes
Over the past years, several financial stress and financial conditions indexes
have been developed. Especially for the United States economists have derived
varios indexes for financial stress. The most prominent indexes that are fre-
quently used to observe the state of financial stability are the KCFSI and the
STFSI. Comparing these indexes to the FSI for Germany shows that financial
stress co-moved significantly over time (Figure 3.4). However, there are a signif-
icant discrepancies during some major historic events. First, the ERM crisis did
not affect financial markets in the United States as it affected financial markets
in Germany. Second, the FSI in the United States increased earlier before the
financial crisis, indicating that financial markets in the United States were af-
fected earlier than in Germany. Third, while the European sovereign debt crisis
had a significant effect on financial stress in Germany, the effects on financial
markets in the United States seem to have been very limited.
Comparing the FSI with an alternative FSI for Germany calculated by the
IMF shows that the indexes behave relatively similar (Figure 3.5). The most
striking difference between the FSI developed in this chapter and the index
calculated by the IMF is during German reunification. While the IMF index
strongly increases during the year 1991, the FSI developed in this chapter re-
mains at very low levels. Regarding the recent financial crisis both indicators
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Figure 3.4: Financial stress indexes for Germany and the United States
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Notes: The data for the KCFSI and the STFSI are provided by Thomson Financial
Datastream.
already increase in the run up to the collapse of Lehman Brothers during the
years 2007 and 2008 and finally peak in October 2008.
Figure 3.5: Financial stress indexes for Germany
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3.3 The impact of financial stress on economic
activity
In order to obtain insights into the effects of financial stress on economic ac-
tivity, I estimate a simple threshold VAR (TVAR) model, containing the FSI,
the 12-month growth rate of industrial production, the inflation rate and the
short-term interest rate. The advantage of the TVAR model is that it allows
accounting for nonlinear effects. Particularly, asymmetric behavior of certain
variables in response to shocks and a framework of multiple equilibria can be
captured using this model framework. Linear VAR models underlay the as-
sumption that there is local instability, that the effects of financial stress are
symmetric and that the variables revert to their deterministic steady-state.
Additionally, one major weakness of linear VAR models to analyze the effects
of financial stress on economic activity is that responses are independent of
the economy’s state. Therefore, I will use a framework that subsequently al-
lows for capturing asymmetric responses to shocks and the economy’s state-
dependencies. One straightforward possibility is to implement regime changes
is a Markov-switching model as proposed by Hamilton (1989). Since the states
are unobservable and do not provide an intuitive economic interpretation, I
abstract from this modeling approach.6
In the following, I will derive a TVAR model to analyze the impact of financial
stress on economic activity. A priori, I assume that financial stress becomes a
major concern for the real economy when it exceeds a certain threshold and the
financial system is under strain. First, I test for threshold effects and present
linear impulse response functions. Particularly, I compare a one-regime linear
VAR with a regime dependent linear VAR. Second, I estimate a non-linear VAR
and present nonlinear impulse responses..
A TVAR model is a simple extension of a threshold autoregressive model, orig-
inally introduced by Tong (1978). I set up a model consisting of the FSI, the
growth rate of industrial production (∆IPt), the inflation rate (pit), and the
short-term interest rate it. The TVAR model has the following form:
Yt = Λ1Yt−1 + Λ2Yt−1I[zt−d ≥ z∗] + ηt, (3.10)
6Results for a Markov-Switching model using the indicator are available upon request.
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where Yt = [FSIt ∆IPt pit it]′ is a 4×1 vector of endogenous variables at time
t, zt is a scalar regime indicator and z∗ the estimated threshold value and Λ1 and
Λ2 are time-invariant 4× 4 matrices. The function I[·] is an indicator function
which takes the value 1 if the threshold variable zt−d is above the estimated
threshold value z∗. ηt is an (n×1) vector of i.i.d. error terms fulfilling E(ηt) = 0
and E(ηtη′t) = Σ. The data are taken from Thomson Financial Datastream. I
use monthly data covering a sample period from April 1970 to December 2012.
In order to identify independent standard normal shocks based on the esti-
mated reduced form shocks, I apply a standard Cholesky decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix. The FSI is contemporaneously independent of all
shocks excluding its own. This ordering approach has become standard in the
literature. It is for example also employed by Bloom (2009), Matheson (2011),
Cardarelli et al. (2011) and Holló et al. (2012).7 First, the structural shock
identification can be justified by considering information availability. Data on
industrial production is published with a significant time lag. The data in-
formation is thus not available for financial market participants in real time.
Therefore, it is unlikely to be reflected in contemporaneous asset prices and
other financial market variables.8 Second, it can be justified from a theoretical
perspective. Increasing financial stress reflects uncertainty and high risk per-
ception which can lead to "wait and see effects" (Bloom (2009) and Basu and
Bundick (2012)).
I assume that the threshold model is determined by a single regime indicator zt.
In general, this indicator is specified as a moving average of one variable in the
VAR model. The lag-length of the TVAR is determined jointly with the delay
of the threshold variables. In this case, the regime indicator is the first lag of
the FSI. In the subsection below, I report the critical values of the threshold
tests.
3.3.1 Threshold Tests
In order to estimate the TVAR model, it is essential to initially test for potential
thresholds. This can be formally tested using the two-step conditional least
7An alternative ordering, where industrial production is independent and the FSI is con-
temporaneously dependent of all other shocks, yields qualitatively similar results, which are
available upon request.
8See Holló et al. (2012).
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squares procedure proposed by Tsay (1998) and alternatively by a Wald test
developed by Hansen (1999).9 In both tests the null hypothesis of a linear VAR
can be tested against the alternative hypothesis of a non-linear VAR.
Table 3.1: Threshold Tests
Tsay-test Hansen-test
d Test Statistic Estimated threshold value Estimated threshold value
1 35.44 (0.00001) -0.0154 -0.0514 (0.031)
2 34.87 (0.00006) -0.0284 -0.0522 (0.035)
Notes: H0: linear VAR, H1: threshold VAR; The p-values are reported in brackets.
One problem that arises is that the threshold value z∗ is not identified under
the null-hypothesis. Therefore the tests consist of running a grid search of the
threshold variables zt. Tsay (1998) developed a test simultaneously determining
the delay of the threshold variable and the threshold value z∗. In both cases,
with a threshold delay of d=1 and d=2, the test rejects the null hypothesis of
a linear VAR (Table 3.1).
Figure 3.6: Threshold test
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Notes: Scatterplot of threshold estimation based on AIC for TVAR(4) against VAR(4).
9The p-values for the Hansen test is computed by bootstrapping techniques with 1000
replications. Detailed results of the Hansen test statistic are available upon request.
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The results of this test shows that the threshold value are in both cases close
to zero. The Hansen test supports this finding. Figure 3.6 shows the Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC) with respect to various potential threshold values for
the FSI with two lags (TVAR(4)) under the Tsay-test. The optimal specification
is a TVAR(4) model with the first lag of the FSI (zt−1) as a threshold variable.
3.3.2 Impulse Response Analysis
In order to analyze the propagation mechanism of financial stress on economic
activity I conduct an impulse response analysis. First, I compute impulse re-
sponse functions (IRF) of a linear one-regime VAR as a benchmark model.
Second, I compare these results with the TVAR model described above. In
particular, I calculate regime-dependent linear IRF. Within this specification,
it is assumed that the economy permanently stays in the regime for the rest
of the time period. Finally, similarly to Balke (2000), I apply the methodol-
ogy of Koop et al. (1996) and calculate nonlinear impulse response functions
(NIRF), which allows for conditional dynamics due to the endogenous nature
of the threshold variable. In all three analysis, financial stress has a significant
effect on economic activity.
Linear Impulse Responses
The impulse responses of a linear VAR can be written in the following form:
IRFt+h|t(et) = E[Yt+h|Yt−1, et]− E[Yt+h|Yt−1], (3.11)
where the realization of the expected path of responses depends on the state
realized in t− 1, and et is a vector of random disturbances. For the one-regime
linear VAR, the IRF are directly computed by taking the estimated coefficients
over the entire sample period. For the TVAR model described above, I assume
two regimes a priori: a high stress regime and a low stress regime. In the regime-
dependent linear IRF, I split the samples with respect to their regime state and
estimate independently two different linear IRF. At time t the economy is either
in the low stress or in the high stress regime. This methodology assumes that
the FSI remains in the same state infinitely and does not change regimes. Given
that the economy is in a certain regime the impulse responses may differ after a
standard deviation shock to financial stress. For the linear IRF and the regime
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dependent IRF, I assume a similar identification scheme for all regimes, i.e. a
standard Cholesky decomposition with a lower triangular matrix.
The results from the impulse response analysis are threefold. First, the IRF
show that increases in financial stress have significant effects on economic ac-
tivity in general (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7: Linear IRF of industrial production growth to shocks in the FSI
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percent.
Second, while financial stress shocks in the high stress regime dampen indus-
trial production significantly, its effects in the low stress regime are negligible.
In the high stress regime, one positive standard deviation increase of the FSI
causes industrial production to drop by about 1.5 percent after 8 months. The
effects on the inflation rate are more modest, reducing headline inflation by
only about 0.2 percentage points after 5-8 months (see appendix for details).
The short-term interest rate falls slightly but persistently in response to a shock
in financial stress. After 12 months, the interest rate is about 0.4 percentage
points lower. At a longer horizon, the endogenous variables converge back to
their deterministic steady-state level. Third, the effects of financial stress on
economic activity are noticeably underestimated when the model is estimated
in a one-regime linear VAR model. While a one standard deviation financial
stress shock leads to a reduction in output of about 1.5 percent in the high stress
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regime, the one-regime linear VAR indicates a drop by about 0.8 percent. These
findings emphasize the importance of a nonlinear estimation methodology for
the analysis of financial shocks.
Nonlinear Impulse Responses
Alternatively to regime-dependent linear impulse responses, under which the
impulse responses are symmetric and independent of the shocks’ algebraic sign,
I compute nonlinear IRF, originally proposed by Koop et al. (1996). Technically,
the nonlinear IRF can be expressed as follows:
NIRFh = E[Yt+h|Ωt−1, et]− E[Yt+h|Ωt−1], (3.12)
where Ωt−1 is an information set available in t−1 and et is a particular realization
of shocks.
I closely follow the methodology of Balke (2000), who estimates the effects of
credit growth on economic using a TVAR model. This methodology requires
to calculate the conditional expectation expressions of the endogenous variables
with the shock (E[Yt+k|Ωt−1, et]) and without the shock (E[Yt+k|Ωt−1]) in order
to account for different size and the algebraic sign of the IRF. Accordingly, the
simulation is implemented by drawing vectors of shocks et+j, where j = 1, . . . , n.
The simulation is implemented with 500 draws. The model has to be simulated
with negative shocks analogously in order to ensure that possible asymmetry is
excluded (Balke (2000)). Similarly to the findings using linear regime-dependent
IRF, the nonlinear IRF indicate that an increase in financial stress leads to a
strong downturn of economic activity (Figure 3.8).
The reaction to a shock in financial stress is quite symmetric with respect to
the sign, i.e. negative shocks induce a similar dynamic adjustment pattern
of the endogenous variables as positive shocks. Notably, industrial production
decreases significantly stronger after a shock to the FSI in the high stress regime
than in the low stress regime. In addition, responses in inflation and the interest
rate also are more pronounced in the high stress regime.
To sum up, the results from the impulse response analysis, both linear and
nonlinear IRF indicate that shocks in the FSI lead to a downturn in economic
activity when the FSI exceeds a certain threshold. Additionally, financial stress
also also exhibits stronger effects on inflation and the nominal interest rate,
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Figure 3.8: Nonlinear impulse responses
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when the level of the FSI is above the threshold. These results are also robust
with respect to other specifications.
3.4 Conclusion
The disruptive events on financial markets during the past years showed that
financial factors were too peripheral in standards macroeconomic models. Mon-
itoring the state of financial stability has become a major concern for policy
makers in the wake financial and the European sovereign debt crisis. In this
chapter, I have developed a financial stress index for Germany that is applica-
ble as an index for the state of financial stability. The index is calculated with
a dynamic approximate factor model using 18 financial market variables from
1970 until 2012. The methodology I apply allows for an arbitrary pattern of
missing data, which is useful to consider the index in real time.
To evaluate the effects of financial stress on economic activity, I estimated
a set of impulse response functions. As the threshold tests support the pres-
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ence of two different regimes financial stress, I set up a threshold VAR model
with standard macroeconomic variables and the financial stress index. While
a one-regime linear VAR strongly underestimates the impact of financial stress
during financial market turmoils, a two-regime linear VAR model captures the
nonlinearities in the model. Subsequently, I also calculate nonlinear impulse
response functions to evaluate the proportionality of different financial stress
shock sizes. The nonlinear impulse response functions are calculated as differ-
ences between the simulated paths of the model variables with and without the
shock of financial stress. The results emphasize the importance of nonlinearities
when analyzing financial shocks
The main findings of this chapter are that high financial stress has significant
effects on output. I show that if the index exceeds a certain threshold, an
increase in the index can be considered as an additional early warning variable
for a decline of industrial production in Germany. This finding is in line with
other related papers such as Bloom (2009), Holló et al. (2012) and Brave and
Butters (2011).
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B Appendix
B.1 Data
All data series included in the index, including the native frequency, the first
observation, the data category and the original source are presented in table
B1.
Variables related to the banking sector (figure B1)
TED spread The TED spread is calculated as the difference between the one-
month and twelve-month money market rate (Fibor/Euribor). The TED spread
is an important money market indicator, indicating liquidity and confidence in
the banking sector. A shortage of liquidity causes a decrease in supply in the
money market, which causes an increase in the TED spread and contributes
positively to the FSI.
Money market spread The money market spread is the difference between
the 3-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor, which is the average in-
terest rate at which European banks lend unsecured funds to other market
participants) and the Eurepo (the benchmark for secured money market op-
erations). An increase in the spread reflects an increase in uncertainty in the
money market and can be interpreted as a risk premium.
β of the banking sector The beta of the banking sector is determined as the
covariance of stock market and banking returns divided by the standard devia-
tion of stock market returns. It follows from the standard capital asset pricing
model (CAPM). A beta larger than one indicates that banking stocks shift more
than proportionally than the overall stock market and that the banking sector
is thus riskier (see also Balakrishnan et al. (2009)).
Banking equity risk index The banking equity index is a capital weighted
total return index calculated by Thomson Financial Datastream. It consists of
eight German Banks that have been included in the index continuously since
1973 and further 10 banks that were gradually included over the course of the
sample period. I calculate the risk premium as in Behr and Steffen (2006), where
it is constructed as a fraction bank stock returns over a risk-free interest rate. I
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determine the yield of the banking equity index by using daily log-differences of
the time series and then subtract it from a risk-free interest rate. In this case,
I use the one-month secured money market rate (1m Eurepo).
Bank securities spread This indicator is measured by the difference between
bank securities with the maturity of 2 years and AAA-rated (German) govern-
ment bonds with the same maturity. An increase in the spread reflects that
investors perceive the risk in the banking sector to be on the rise. The time
series for bank securities is taken from the banking statistics from the Bundes-
bank.
Expected bank lending (BLS) This indicator comes from the ECB’s Bank
Lending Survey. In this survey, banks are asked to report their assessment of
how credit lending standards will evolve within the next three months. The
Bundesbank reports the national results for the survey. The survey is con-
ducted on a quarterly basis. Increasing values indicate an expected tightening
in lending standards which contributes positively to the FSI.
ifo credit constraint indicator This indicator comes from a survey conducted
by the ifo Institute. In this survey, firms are asked to report their assessment
of how credit lending standards are currently evolving. Increasing values of the
indicator reflect a tightening of credit conditions, which contributes positively
to the FSI. The ifo credit conditions indicator is reported on a monthly basis.
CDS on financial corporations This index is an average of 5-year credit de-
fault swaps on the most important (largest ten) financial corporations, i.e. com-
mercial banks. Increasing values of the index reflects that investors perceive the
risk in the financial sector to be on the rise.
Excess liquidity Value of bank deposits at the ECB that exceed the minimum
reserve requirements. High use of the ECB deposit facility reflects uncertainty
in the interbank market. Banks prefer to hold their excess reserves with the
ECB rather than to lend it to the non-financial sector or to other banks via the
interbank market.
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Figure B1: Variables related to the banking sector
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Variables related to the capital market (figure B2)
Corporate bond spread The corporate bond spread is the difference between
the yield on BBB-rated corporate bonds with a maturity of 5 years and the
yield on AAA-rated (German) government bonds with the same maturity. The
spread increases with higher perceived risk in the corporate bond market. This
spreads contains credit, liquidity, and market risk premia.
Corporate loan spread The corporate credit spread measures the difference
between the yield on one-to-two year loans to non-financial corporations and
the rate for secured money market transactions (Eurepo).
Housing loan spread The housing spread measures the difference between the
interest rate on all housing loans to private households and the interest rate for
secured money market transactions (3m Eurepo).
CDS on corporate sector This index is an average of 5-year credit default
swaps on the DAX 30 non-financial corporations’ outstanding debt. For the euro
area, it is a simple average of non-financial firms, using data for different sectors
from Thomson Financial Datastream. Increasing values of this index indicate
that investors perceive the risk that non-financial corporate will default on their
debt to be on the rise.
VDAX/HVDAX The VDAX measures implied stock volatility. Usually, an
increase in stock market volatility reflects a higher degree of uncertainty and
risk perception. This time series is available from 1996M1. Before 1996 I use
the historical volatility of the DAX (HVDAX), estimated with a GARCH(1,1)
model of the realized stock return volatility of the DAX30. The correlation of
this time series between 1996 and 2011 is over 90 percent.
Stock market returns This variable measures the inverted monthly year-on-
year yield of the DAX. Increasing values contribute positively to the FSI.
Term spread The term spread reflects bank profitability. I determine this
indicator by taking the difference between the short- and long-term yields on
government bonds. It can be seen as a measurement for the possible degree
of maturity transformation. Usually, banks generate profits by intermediating
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from short-term liabilities (deposits) to long-term assets (loans). A negative
slope of the yield curve, i.e. a negative term spread, therefore indicates a
decrease in bank profitability.10
Corr(REX,DAX) The REX is a fixed-income performance index. Increasing
interest rates imply a decreasing REX index. Hence, a negative correlation
between REX and DAX indicates a positive correlation between DAX and the
general level of interest rates.
Figure B2: Variables related to the capital market
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own calculations.
10See Cardarelli et al. (2011).
71
Chapter 3 Financial stress and economic activity in Germany
Variables related to the foreign exchange market (figure B3)
REERV (GARCH(1,1)) This index measures the volatility of the real effective
exchange rate (REER). The REER is deflated by the consumer price index with
respect to 20 trading partners. An ARCH-test rejected the null hypothesis of
the lack of GARCH effects at a significance level of 95 percent. Hence, in order
to determine real exchange rate volatility, I use a GARCH(1,1) model. The
results are displayed below.
Table B2: Estimation Results of the GARCH(1,1) model
Parameter Value Standard Error t-Statistic
C 0.00 0.00 -0.39
K 0.00 0.00 1.23
GARCH(1) 0.61 0.25 2.64
ARCH(1) 0.08 0.06 1.35
Notes: The conditional probability distribution was chosen to be Gaussian.
Figure B3: Real effective exchange rate
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B.2 Linear impulse response functions
Linear VAR
Figure B4: Impulse response function of the linear VAR to a shock in financial
stress
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Regime dependent linear impulse response functions
Figure B5: Impulse response functions: high-stress regime
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Figure B6: Impulse response functions: low-stress regime
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B.3 Nonlinear impulse response functions
Figure B7: Nonlinear impulse response functions
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CHAPTER4
Financial stress and economic dynamics:
An application to France1
4.1 Introduction
The financial crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 led to
severe recessions in industrialized countries. In the euro area, the crisis was
exacerbated by strongly increasing government debt positions of several member
states and systemic banking crises due to a high exposure of commercial banks.
The potential impact of financial shocks had been dramatically underestimated
before the financial crisis, as central banks had mainly focused on price stability
and banking regulations had been further relaxed over the past decade.
Before the financial crisis, developments on financial markets had only a
marginal role in most macroeconomic models (Borio (2011b)). Therefore, the
vast majority of these models did not take into account imbalances in financial
accounts and financial stress.2 However, for policy makers, it is crucially im-
portant to enhance theoretical and empirical methods for detecting potential
misalignment on financial markets at an early stage. In particular, major chal-
lenges are to (1) improve the monitoring of financial stability, (2) identify and
foresee potential sources and causes of financial stress and (3) elaborate and
communicate the effects of financial stress on the economy.
1This chapter is based on: Aboura and van Roye (2013). Financial stress and economic
dynamics: an application to France. Kiel Working Paper No. 1834, The Kiel Institute for
the World Economy.
2Some structural models already included financial variables, such as the financial accel-
erator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) and Iacoviello (2005), who modeled asset prices in an
otherwise standard structural macroeconomic model.
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Against this background, monitoring and supervising the soundness of the
financial system is eminent for both the monetary and fiscal authority. Particu-
larly, a detailed analysis of financial stress is one major tool in a broader micro-
and macro-prudential policy framework. To this end, the recent events have led
to a re-orientation of financial stability for central banks, regulation authorities
and policy makers in the meantime. Many institutions have begun intensifying
its monitoring of financial variables such as stock market indicators, volatility
measures and credit aggregates. In addition to monitoring single indicators in-
dependently, many institutions have begun to capture a general development
of whole financial markets in composite indicators.3 The European Central
Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the
Bank for International Settlement (BIS) have developed financial stress indexes
for different countries to assess and monitor their current states of financial
stability.4
In addition to monitoring and supervising the financial system, a financial
stress analysis is important for understanding the effects of financial shocks on
the economy. From both a theoretical and empirical perspective, the effects of
financial stress may be considerable. Economic theory suggests that increases in
financial stress lead to changing behavior of private sector investment and con-
sumption. While effects through the investment channel are driven by long-term
interest rates and the user costs of capital, the effects through the consumption
channel are mainly driven by wealth and income effects. Higher risk perception
of market participants and increasing uncertainty may lead to a downturn in the
business cycle. Paries et al. (2011) show that increases in money market spreads
decrease bank lending, which directly reduces economic activity. In addition,
Bloom (2009), Baker et al. (2012), Basu and Bundick (2012), Christiano et al.
(2013), and Bonciani and van Roye (2013) show that increasing uncertainty
directly leads to economic contractions.
Empirical evidence suggests that financial stress leads to economic contrac-
tions (Cardarelli et al. (2011), Davig and Hakkio (2010), Hakkio and Keeton
3For a detailed description of the necessity of building financial stress indexes for policy
makers, see Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009) and Borio (2011a).
4See Holló et al. (2012), Hakkio and Keeton (2009), Cardarelli et al. (2011), Guichard
et al. (2009) and Ng (2011).
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(2009), and Cevik et al. (2012)). Holló et al. (2012) show that increases in the
Composite Index of Systemic Stress (CISS), that is constructed by the ECB
for its macroprudential analysis, lead to persistent declines industrial produc-
tion in the euro area if the CISS exceeds a certain threshold. Similarly, van
Roye (2013) shows contractionary business cycle effects for Germany. Finally,
Hubrich and Tetlow (2012) investigate the impact of the financial stress index
developed by the St. Louis Federal Reserve on economic activity in the U.S.
using a five-variable Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregressive Model
(MSBVAR). They also find evidence that economic dynamics are regime de-
pendent, conditional on a high- or low-stress regime.
The definitions of financial stress vary across the literature. In general, fi-
nancial stress is synonymous to the state of financial instability. Financial
instability itself has quite different definitions and different dimensions. While
measuring price stability is fairly straightforward, financial instability is not
directly observable and it is difficult to measure. Therefore, several approaches
have been introduced to capture financial instability. In this chapter, we de-
fine financial stress as a mixture of uncertainty and risk perception. In fact,
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) show that periods of high uncertainty are also
associated with higher risk perception, i.e. rising credit spreads. We exploit
this co-movement of uncertainty and risk perception by using a dynamic factor
model that identifies a common underlying component of these two measures.
While uncertainty is mostly reflected in the second moments of the variables,
risk perception is captured in the first moments. High levels of uncertainty and
high risk premia create a situation in which the financial system is strained
and its intermediation function is impaired. We closely follow the econometric
methodology of van Roye (2013), who constructs a financial stress index for
Germany.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 explains the modeling method-
ology and the estimation technique. Section 4.3 presents the indicator and
evaluates its ability to capture the main systemic events that have occurred in
France. Subsequently, in section 4.4, we analyze the effects of financial stress
on economic dynamics using a Markov-Switching VAR model. Section 4.5 sum-
marizes the main results and concludes.
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4.2 Methodology
The literature proposes many different approaches to aggregate data into a sin-
gle indicators. Researchers typically face two trade-offs when being confronted
with data collection and aggregation methods. These trade-offs also apply to to
construction of financial stress indexes.5 The first trade-off is the data selection
with respect to the time span. In general, a large sample with a long history
is desirable to test the indicator’s predictive properties and statistical charac-
teristics over the business cycle. However, many financial variables that are
particularly reflective for financial stress, e.g. credit default swap premia and
money market spreads, are only available over very recent time periods. In this
case, a shorter data sample might be preferable because these variables might
better reflect financial stress than other measures that are available for a longer
time horizon. The second trade-off is the frequency at which the financial vari-
ables enter the financial stress index. This trade-off depends on the type of data
used, which can be available in daily, weekly, monthly or quarterly frequencies.
For instance, stock market indexes and credit default swap premia are available
on a daily basis, whereas some survey indicators, such as bank lending credit
standards, are only reported once in a quarter. The advantage of having higher
frequency data is that the potential stress signals on financial markets can be
identified at an early stage. The disadvantage is that it is significantly more
volatile and usually delivers more false signals.
We address these trade-offs by using a methodology that addresses both the
data frequency trade-off and the time span trade-off. First, using a dynamic
factor model in combination with the Expectation Maximization algorithm al-
lows to include time series that are available over a long time period as well
as those that have a short data history. The approach also allows for treating
mixed frequency data. We can include native daily, monthly and quarterly fre-
quencies into the estimation of the financial stress index, which will ultimately
be calculated on a monthly basis. In the following subsection, we will present
the underlying econometric methodology of the model and provide details on
the construction and transformation of the data.
5For a detailed description of these trade-offs and how this issue is addressed in the
literature, see Kliesen and Smith (2010).
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4.2.1 Dynamic Approximate Factor Model
In this chapter, we follow the methodology of Banbura and Modugno (2012)
and van Roye (2013), estimating a dynamic approximate factor model (DFM)
that allows for an arbitrary pattern of missing data and a mixed frequency
estimation including daily, monthly and quarterly data in the indicator. The
factor model allows us to capture the co-movement of all considered financial
variables and extract the underlying latent factor that can be interpreted as
financial stress. In particular, the model takes the following form:
yt = Λft + εt, where εt ∼ iid N (0, C), (4.1)
where yt is a matrix of financial variables, ft is the 1× T common latent factor
containing the time-varying co-movement in the N × T matrix (the common
volatility factor), and Λ is a N×1 vector of the time series’ factor loadings. The
values in the factor loading vector represent the extent to which each financial
variable time series is affected by the common factor. The N × 1 vector εt rep-
resents the idiosyncratic component, which is allowed to be slightly correlated
at all leads and lags. The dynamics of the latent factor ft are described in the
transition equation:
ft = Aft−1 + ξt, where ξt ∼ iid N (0, D), (4.2)
Before estimation, the time series are de-meaned and standardized. Re-
garding the estimation technique of the model, we closely follow Banbura and
Modugno (2012) and apply a maximum-likelihood approach combined with the
Expectation Maximization algorithm originally proposed by Dempster et al.
(1977). This model allows for an efficient treatment of ragged edges, mixed
data frequencies and an arbitrary pattern of missing data.6
4.2.2 Data
The financial variables that we include for calculating the financial stress index
are in a way subjectively chosen. We select the financial variables that we believe
are mostly relevant to describe the stability of the financial system. All of the
data rely on economic fundamentals such as interest spreads, credit spreads,
6For a detailed description of the estimation technique, see Banbura and Modugno (2012),
and for an application to a financial stress index, see van Roye (2013).
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liquidity premia, stock market indicators and volatility measures of financial
markets. First, we collect data that are directly linked to the banking sector.
Beside profit expectations, risk spreads, and credit default swaps, we compute
a banking sector volatility index given by a ARMA(1,1)-TGARCH(1,1) model.
In addition, using a CAPM model we calculate the implicit cost of equity for
commercial banks. Second, we collect general capital market data, such as bond
yields, the stock returns of important French corporations, and derivatives such
as CDS spreads. Third, we collect data from the foreign exchange market and
calculate a nominal exchange rate volatility index. A detailed description about
data sources and data transformation is provided in the following subsection.
Variables related to the banking sector (figure 4.1)
The first group we consider are financial variables related to the banking sector.
In particular, we calculate indicators that in some way reflect the state of finan-
cial stability in the sector of monetary financial institutions. For the banking
sector, we use 7 financial variables.
TED spread The TED spread is calculated as the difference between the
3-month PIBOR/Euribor as reported by the OECD and French government
treasury bills with a maturity of 13 weeks as reported by the Banque de France.
The TED spread is an important indicator for interbank lending conditions.
While increasing liquidity in the money market leads to a reduction, decreasing
money market liquidity leads to an increase in this spread. An increasing TED
spread therefore contributes positively to financial stress.
Money market spread We calculate the indicator by taking the difference of
the 3-month unsecured money market rate (3-month Euribor) and the secured
money market rate (3-month Eurepo). An increasing spread between these two
interest rates induces a rising risk perception in the money market. Similar to
the TED spread, an increasing money market spread contributes positively to
financial stress.
β of the banking sector The β of the banking sector is derived from the
standard CAPM model and represents the sensitivity of bank stocks to general
market risk. It is calculated as the covariance of bank stocks and the French
stock market index SBF 250 divided by the variance of the SBF 250. Increases
82
Chapter 4 Financial stress and economic dynamics: An
application to France
Figure 4.1: Variables related to the banking sector
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in β can be interpreted as a proxy for rising equity costs for commercial banks.
The β of the banking sector contributes positively to financial stress.
Banking sector equity index The database consists of 6.782 daily closing
prices that span the period of June, 25th 1986 to June, 21st 2012. This pe-
riod includes both calm and extreme sub-periods. The prices are computed by
Datastream as a French banking sector index. The sector includes 4 banks:
BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Sociéte Générale, Natixis. We calculate the first
differences of this index as a measure of the state of a banking profit situation.
A decreasing equity index reflects negative profit expectations, which may put
pressure on the financial sector’s balance sheet. Decreasing bank equity leads
to an increase in financial stress.
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Expected bank lending The expected bank lending is directly taken from
the ECB Bank Lending Survey. Selected country-specific results are available
at certain national central banks. In our case, the Banque de France provides
data for France for expected bank lending in the next 3 months. The data
are only available on a quarterly basis. Increases in this indicator reflect a
tightening in credit standards for private sector credit, as reported by important
financial institutions in France. Increases in this indicator contribute positively
to financial stress.
Credit default swaps on financial corporations The credit default swap
(CDS) index is the weighted average of the 10 year maturity CDS of important
French financial institutions. In particular, we include the following banks: BNP
Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Dexia, Crédit Local and Société Générale. Weights
are computed according to market capitalization. Because these credit default
swaps indicate the default risk of financial institutions, increasing values con-
tribute positively to financial stress.
Banking sector volatility The volatility of the French banking sector is com-
puted from the banking sector equity index with the following methodology.
First, we examine all the possible specifications within five lags to choose the
appropriate volatility model. We test 25 specifications of ARMA(p,q) models
with p = 1, ..., 5 and q = 1, ..., 5 in addition to 25 specifications with ARMA(p,q)
+ GARCH(1,1). Second, we select the more parsimonious model. Four crite-
ria are used for comparison: the log-likelihood value, the Akaike criterion, the
autocorrelogram of residuals and squared residuals and the ARCH effect test.
We take into consideration the trade-off between parsimony and maximizing
criteria and find that the ARMA(1,1) + GARCH(1,1) model produces the best
fit. Third, we test an alternative model that allows for leverage effects by con-
sidering the contribution of the negative residuals in the ARCH effect. The
ARMA(1,1) + TGARCH(1,1) model offers improvements for the considered
criteria. We define the banking sector log returns as {Bt}t=1,...,T with T =
6.782 daily observations. The ARMA(1,1) +TGARCH (1,1) specification is
then provided as follows:
logBt = µ1 + φ1 logBt−1 + θ1B,t−1 + B,t (4.3)
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with the innovations B,t being functions of ZB,t and σB,t
B,t = ZB,tσB,t (4.4)
where the standardized returns ZB,t are independent and identically distributed,
such as:
Zt ↪→ FB,Z(0, 1) (4.5)
where FB,Z is an unknown distribution of Z. The time-varying volatility model
σB,t is given by:
σ2B,t = ω + α (ZB,t−1σB,t−1)
2 + γ (ZB,t−1σB,t−1)2 IZB,t−1σB,t−1<0 + βσ2B,t−1 (4.6)
The banking sector volatility index is a proxy for uncertainty in the financial
sector. Since higher uncertainty on the banking sector’s outlook may concur
in more restrictive lending to the non-financial sector, this index contributes to
positively to the financial stress index.
Variables related to the capital market (figure 4.2)
The second group of financial variables we consider are variables related to the
capital market. In particular, we consider credit spreads, bond spreads, yield
indexes and credit default swaps. For the capital market variables, we choose 9
indicators.
Term spread The term spread – the difference between short-term and long-
term interest rates – is an indicator for predicting changes in economic activity.
Usually, the term spread is positive; i.e., the yield curve slopes upward. How-
ever, many recessions are preceded by decreasing term spreads and sometimes
even exhibit an inverted yield curve.7 A decreasing term spread results in higher
values of the financial stress index.
7For a survey on the ability to forecast output growth in industrialized countries, see
Wheelock and Wohar (2009).
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Figure 4.2: Variables related to the capital market
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Corporate credit spread The credit spread measures the difference between
the yield on one to two year loans to non-financial corporations and the rate
for secured money market transactions (Eurepo) with the same maturity. An
increase in this spread reflects higher capital costs for non-financial corporations
which contributes positively to financial stress.
Housing credit spread The housing spread is calculate by taking the differ-
ence between interest rates for mortgages with an average maturity of 5 years
and the yield of French government bonds with the same maturity. Rising
spreads reflect increasing risk perception by banks with respect to their mort-
gage lending. Therefore, this indicator contributes positively to the financial
stress index.
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Consumer credit spread The consumer credit spread is calculated by taking
the difference between the interest rates for consumer credit with an average
maturity of 5 years and the yield of French government bonds with the same
maturity. Rising spreads reflect increasing risk perception by banks with to con-
sumer loans. Therefore, this indicator is contributes positively to the financial
stress index.
Stock market log-returns (CAC 40) The French stock market series of log
returns is a special series combining the "Indice General" stock index (January,
2nd 1970 to December, 30th 1987) and the CAC 40 stock index, which has
been computed since December, 31st 1987. The Indice General, which is the
ancestor of the CAC 40, is not publicly available. For simplicity, this long
series representing the French stock market is called CAC 40 log returns. This
database consists of 10.671 daily closing prices. Falling stock prices contribute
positively to the financial stress index.
Stock market historical volatility We construct the historical volatility series
from the CAC 40 log return series. Therefore, this database consists of 10.671
daily volatilities that span from January, 2nd 1970 to July, 31st 2012. We follow
the same methodology used for the banking sector index volatility construction.
We find that the ARMA(2,4)+TGARCH(1,1) model improves the fit in all
considered criteria. We define the market log-returns as {Rt}t=1,...,T with T=
10.671 daily observations. The ARMA(2,4) + TGARCH (1,1) specification is
as follows:
Rt = µ+
2∑
i=1
φiRt−i +
4∑
i=1
θiR,t−i + R,t (4.7)
with the innovations R,t being functions of ZR,t and σR,t:
R,t = ZR,tσR,t (4.8)
where the standardized returns ZR,t are independent and identically distributed:
ZR,t ↪→ FR,Z(0, 1) (4.9)
87
Chapter 4 Financial stress and economic dynamics: An
application to France
where FR,Z is an unknown distribution of Z. The time-varying volatility model
σR,t is given by the following:
σ2R,t = ω + α (ZR,t−1σR,t−1)
2 + γ (ZR,t−1σR,t−1)2 IZR,t−1σR,t−1<0 + βσ2R,t−1 (4.10)
Stock market volatility can be interpreted as aggregate uncertainty on finan-
cial markets on future economic activity (Bloom (2009)). Higher uncertainty
increases potential strains on financial markets. Against this background, this
index contributes positively to the financial stress index.
Credit default swaps on corporate sector The credit default swap index is
the weighted average of the 10 year maturity CDS of important French corpora-
tions. In particular, we include the following firms: Accor, Alcan France, Alca-
tel, Allianz France, Arcelor Mittal France, Assurance Générale de France, Axa,
Bouygues Télécom, Carrefour, Casino, Cie de Saint-Gobain, Danone, EDF,
France Télécom, GDF Suez, Gecina, Havas and Air Liquide. Weights are com-
puted according to market capitalization.
Government bond spread The government bond spread is calculated by using
the average yield of French government bonds with a maturity of 10 years and
subtract it from the corresponding German government bonds. An increase in
this spread reflects the market’s higher risk perception with respect to French
government bonds and contributes positively to financial stress.
Credit default swap on 1Y Government Bonds The premium for govern-
ment credit default swaps reflects a default probability of outstanding sovereign
debt. If the default probability rises, tensions on banks’ balance sheets and
the whole financial system increase. Therefore, the government CDS affects
financial stress positively.
Variable related to the foreign exchange market (figure 4.3)
The third group consists of an indicator that indicates stress on the foreign
exchange market. More precisely, we calculate a nominal synthetic exchange
rate volatility.
88
Chapter 4 Financial stress and economic dynamics: An
application to France
Figure 4.3: Variable related to foreign exchange market
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Nominal synthetic exchange rate volatility This historical volatility series
is constructed from the nominal synthetic exchange rate. This special series is
the synthetic dollar-euro nominal exchange rate and is based on trade weights
given by the share of external trade of each euro area member state in the
total euro area trade. It is computed by the ECB. The database consists of
8.499 daily exchange rates that span from January, 7th 1980 to July, 31, 2012.
We follow the same methodology used for the banking sector index volatility
construction. We find that the ARMA(2,4)+TGARCH(1,1) model improves
the fit in all considered criteria. We define the exchange rate log-returns as
{Et}t=1,...,T with T= 8.499 daily observations. The ARMA(2,2) + TGARCH
(1,1) specification is then provided as follows:
Et = µ+
2∑
i=1
φiEt−i +
2∑
i=1
θiE,t−i + E,t (4.11)
with the innovations E,t being functions of ZE,t and σE,t:
E,t = ZE,tσE,t (4.12)
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where the standardized returns ZE,t are independent and identically distributed:
Zt ↪→ FE,Z(0, 1) (4.13)
where FE,Z is an unknown distribution of Z. The time-varying volatility model
σE,t is given by the following:
σ2E,t = ω + α (ZE,t−1σE,t−1)
2 + γ (ZE,t−1σE,t−1)2 IZE,t−1σE,t−1<0 + βσ2E,t−1 (4.14)
After the estimation, we present the factor loadings of the considered financial
variables (table 4.1). The financial variables that contribute most strongly to
the financial stress index are the historical volatility of the CAC 40, the CAC
40 log returns and the banking sector volatility. The term spread and the
government bond spread do not have a significant impact on financial stress in
France.
Table 4.1: Factor loadings of the DFM
Financial variable λi
Banking sector volatility 0.8572
TED spread 0.6966
Historical volatility of the CAC 0.6101
β of the banking sector 0.4726
Expected bank lending 0.4389
Corporate credit spread 0.4308
Exchange rate volatility 0.3851
Consumer credit spread 0.3782
Housing credit spread 0.2851
Credit default swaps on corporate sector 0.2102
Credit default swaps on banking sector 0.1135
Credit default swaps on government bonds 0.1093
Money market spread 0.0989
Term spread 0.0582
Government bond spread -0.0652
CAC 40 log-returns -0.7945
Banking sector equity index -0.9079
Notes: The values are extracted from the loading matrix Λ of the DFM.
90
Chapter 4 Financial stress and economic dynamics: An
application to France
4.3 A financial stress index for France
After estimating the model, we obtain a single composite financial stress index
for France (Figure 4.4). The first incident to which the FSI strongly reacts is
the OPEC oil embargo from October 1973 to March 1974, when France entered
into a recession. Even if France was relatively little exposed to the embargo due
to its specific foreign policy, it was significantly hit by an increase in oil prices
and rising commodity prices. Soaring import prices led to sharply increasing
production costs for the French industry. Splitting up the index into the three
subgroups indicates that mainly the indicators from the banking sector and
from the capital market contributed to the stress on financial markets (Figure
4.5). Nominal exchange rate volatility slightly increased.
Figure 4.4: Financial stress index for France
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Notes: The index is calculated on the basis of 17 financial market variables using a
dynamic approximate factor model. Shaded areas indicate recessions using calculations by
the Economic Cycles Research Institute.
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Figure 4.5: Contributions of subgroups to the FSI
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The next peak of the FSI depicts the largest drop in stock market returns since
the Second World War. It occurred after the presidential election of François
Mitterrand on May 10, 1981. On May 13, 1981, when the left wing released
the list of the companies to be nationalized, it induced a panic on the French
stock market with a one-day decline of -15.1%. The day after, the volatility
reached its highest level of 94.3%. The FSI fairly reproduces this stress on
stock markets and peaks only slightly below the level reached during the oil
embargo. Figure 4.5 confirms that the large part of the FSI increase came from
capital markets (especially stock returns and stock market volatility) and the
banking sector (money market spread), while exchange rate volatility remained
rather subdued.
On October 19, 1987, the French stock market collapsed once again, reacting
to the events happening on stock markets in the United States on "Black Mon-
day". The stock market index successively declined until it reached its lowest
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level in January 1988. At that time, the stock market index lost approximately
40% of its capitalization. Three years later, on August 19, 1991, the Soviet
coup d’état attempt against President Mikhail Gorbachov led to high political
uncertainty in France given the post-Cold War context.
On July, 22 1992, the European exchange rate mechanism was under attack;
indeed, the exchange rate bands widened so much that central banks had to
intervene to stop devaluation in countries like France and support the French
franc. On October, 2 1992, the Bank of France spent 80 billion franc to support
its currency. The FSI also strongly reacts to this event. Figure 4.5 fairly
depicts that the increases in the FSI were mainly driven by higher exchange rate
volatility while the sub-indexes of the banking sector and the capital market do
not rise significantly, since other market segments were not strongly affected.
This is the reason that the effect of the ERM crisis did not have a large effect
on the FSI: it peaks far below the other events in French history.
The next significant increase in the FSI depicts the events associated to the
Asian and Russian crisis as well as the default of the large hedge fund Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998. The French banking sector was
significantly affected by this financial market turmoil. The bank volatility index
was the main driver of increases in financial stress, reaching the highest value
since its first registered value in 1986.
From 1998 until 2001, financial stress dropped to very low levels. Investors
perceived the introduction of the euro as a positive sign for France such that
stock markets dynamically increased and government bond spreads decreased
further. The stock market rally was interrupted with the attacks on the world
trade center on September 11, 2001. Afterward, stock markets recovered quickly
before the worldwide stock market downturn of 2002.8
The highest peak of the FSI occurred before the financial crisis 2008/2009,
after the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
All three subgroups of the FSI indicate large increases in financial stress. The
second largest drop in French stock market returns in history occurred on Oc-
tober 6, 2008, when a panic effect related to the stability of the financial sector
8Stock markets across the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Asia and all over
Europe slid persistently reaching troughs last recorded in 1997 and 1998.
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spread throughout Europe, inducing a dramatic one-day decline of -9.5% of the
CAC. When the US stock market plunged on October 15, 2008, French volatil-
ity hit its second highest level at 92.5% the following day. In this context, after
accumulating bad news, the FSI reached its highest level in November 2008. As
a comparison, the highest level of historical (implied) volatility of the French
stock market since 1982 occurred on October, 16 2008 at 92.7%. In addition,
the highest exchange rate volatility level since 1982 occurred on December 22,
2008 at 29%.
As an economic response to the financial crisis, the French government an-
nounced a 26 billion Euro stimulus plan on December 2008 to stabilize the
economy, anticipating the drastic fall in aggregate demand which in the end
resulted in the worst recession since 1945. At the end of 2010, this stimu-
lus package was increased to 38.8 billion Euro. On the one hand, this policy
may have contributed in a decline of the stress index at the beginning of April
2009, the month that corresponds approximately to the end of the recession
in France. On the other hand, it rapidly increased the government’s debt-to-
GDP ratio putting at stake fiscal solvency. As a result, rating agencies began
downgrading various countries, pushing their sovereign yields up. In May 2010,
the FSI peaked locally, when money markets almost dried out and the Euro-
pean financial system was under strain. In reaction to this, the ECB intervened
on capital markets through bond purchases to reduce the interest rate levels
of sovereign borrowers. Subsequently, the perception of the crisis gravity di-
minished temporarily. In particular, the French economy has been relatively
resilient to investors uncertainty and did not suffer from a large confidence loss
like other peripheral countries such as Spain and Italy.
From August 2011 to January 2012 when market concerns of contagion effects
on other countries in the euro area came up, the FSI increased sharply. In
particular, investors attributed higher default risks to Spain’s and Italy’s debts,
which partly contaminated the credit spread of French corporations and the
government. In addition, investors became uncertain about the future design
of the European monetary union (due to delays in the implementation of the
European Stability Mechanism, general policy uncertainty, and the possible exit
of Greece). This spillover effect to the French economy was quite pronounced for
two reasons. France contributes about 20% to the European Financial Stability
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Facility with a maximum guarantee of 110 billion Euros, which means that
it bears a fifth of a potential bail out. Second, French banks are the most
exposed to peripheral countries; indeed, US money-market funds have cut their
lending to French banks because they may experiment problems of contagion
from the peripheral countries. Consequently, the banking sector index declined
from 1026 points on January 2007 to 235 points in January 2012. The volatility
of the French banking sector peaked at 121% in November, 2 2011. With the
announcement of ECB’s Long Term Refinancing Operations to loan 489 billion
Euros to European banks for three years, the FSI has begun to shift downward
since early 2012. The FSI has decreased further with the launch of the Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the ECB on August, 2 2012.
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4.4 The FSI and economic activity
Typically, periods of high financial stress lead to a reduction in economic ac-
tivity. This has been shown both theoretically and empirically for different
countries. From the theoretical perspective, there are three different channels
through which financial stress has effects on macroeconomic activity. First, in
episodes of high financial stress, firms hesitate to invest or are reluctant to hire
new workers. This effect is sometimes called the "wait-and-see effect" (Bloom
(2009)). Second, banks are more cautious to lend because they increase credit
standards (Bonciani and van Roye (2013)). This channel can be summarized
as a loan supply effect. Third, high financial stress leads to higher funding
costs of the private sector due to higher interest rate spreads and rising liq-
uidity premia (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)). The negative impact of high
financial stress episodes has also been shown empirically for different countries
(see Bloom (2009), Baker et al. (2012), Hakkio and Keeton (2009), Holló et al.
(2012), and van Roye (2013), among others, and Kliesen and Smith (2010) for a
survey). Beside its purpose for financial stability monitoring, the usefulness of
the French FSI crucially depends on its ability to relate financial market devel-
opments to economic activity. Therefore, we will test the FSI on its statistical
properties and its relationship to economic activity in France.
A Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregressive Model
First, we will identify periods of high financial stress and those of low financial
stress. To do so, we have to assume that the properties of FSI are state depen-
dent. Because financial instability can be considered a tail event, we assume two
regimes a priori. In particular, we assume that financial stress occurs suddenly
and stochastically with a certain persistence within either regime. We apply
a Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregressive model (MSBVAR) model
to identify the regimes, i.e., low-stress and high-stress regimes. The Markov-
Switching setup is particularly useful in a nonlinear environment because it can
identify sudden behavioral changes of financial variables. In particular, we use
the MSBVAR model developed by Sims et al. (2008). Therefore, our analysis is
comparable to that of Hubrich and Tetlow (2012), who analyze the impact of
financial stress on the US economy. We set up the model with four endogenous
variables: the financial stress index, the inflation rate, industrial production
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growth and the short-term interest rate, i.e., the 3-month PIBOR/EURIBOR
(Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.6: Variables included in the MSBVAR
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The endogenous vector of the model is given by yt = [FSIt ∆IPt pit it]. We
follow Sims et al. (2008) and set up a MSBVAR as follows:
y′tA0(st) =
ρ∑
i=1
y′t−iAi(st) + z′tC(st) + ε′tΘ−1(st), t = 1, . . . , T, (4.15)
where yt is the 4-dimensional column vector of endogenous variables, A0 is a
non-singular 4×4 matrix and Ai(k) is a 4×4 matrix for 1 ≤ k ≤ h, st are
unobserved states at time t, and ρ is the lag length. and εt ∼ N (0, σ2) is
an n-dimensional shock process. In our case, we assume two states st = 1, 2.
Furthermore, zt is an indicator matrix taking the value 1, representing a column
vector of constants. C(st) is an m × n intercept matrix for 1 ≤ k ≤ h, and Θ
is an m × n diagonal matrix of factor loadings scaling the stochastic volatility
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factors on the vector of unobserved shocks εt. The structural shocks εt are
normal with mean and variance equal to the following:
E[εt|Y1, ..., Yt−1, z1, . . . , zt−1] = 0, (4.16)
E[εtε(t)′|y1, . . . , yt−1, z1, , . . . , zt−1] = In, (4.17)
Defining the initial conditions xt = [yt−1, . . . , yt−ρ, zt]′ and
F (st) = [A1(st)′, . . . , Aρ(st)′, C(st)]′, the model can be written in compact form:
y′tA(st) = x′tF (st) + ε′tΘ−1(st),∀ 1 ≤ t ≤ T, (4.18)
Finally, assuming conditionally normal structural disturbances:
ε′t|Y t−1 ∼ N (0, In), where Y t = {y0, . . . , yt} we can write the model in reduced
form:
y′t = x′tB(st) + u′(st), (4.19)
where
B(st) = F (st)A−1(st), (4.20)
and
u(st) = A
′−1(st)′tΘ(st), (4.21)
The regime change is determined by a first-order Markov process. The Markov
chain has the following probability rule: P(St = j|st−1 = i) = pij, where
p11 + p12 = 1 and p21 + p22 = 1. This implies that the current regime st only
depends on the regime one period before. The model’s parameters θˆ = (φˆ1, φˆ2)
depend on the unobservable regimes in a nonlinear manner. Like Sims et al.
(2008), we apply Bayesian techniques to estimate the model’s parameters.
Prior selection As in all Bayesian models, the priors have to be chosen care-
fully because the results crucially depend on them. Along with the priors we
have to select for the parameters in the reduced-form BVAR, we also have to
impose priors on the transition matrix. We choose priors very similar to those
chosen by Sims et al. (2008) and Hubrich and Tetlow (2012) that are appropri-
ate for a monthly model. We set the overall tightness for the matrices A and F
to 0.6. The relative tightness of the matrix F is set to 0.15, whereas the relative
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tightness of the constant term is chosen to be 0.1. The Dirichlet priors are set
to 5.6 for both the variances and coefficients. All parameters are presented in
the table below.
Table 4.2: Prior selection for hyperparameters
Type of prior Value
Overall tightness for A and F 0.57
Relative tightness for F 0.13
Relative tightness for the constant term 0.1
Tightness on lag decay 1.2
Weight on nvars sums of coefficients dummy observations 10
Weight on single dummy initial observation including constant 10
Notes: Priors are selected based on Sims et al. (2008) and Hubrich and Tetlow (2012).
We use monthly data that range from 1971M1 to 2012M8, which leaves us 488
data points for each time series. To identify the BVAR model, we apply a lower
triangle Choleski-decomposition of A(st). In figure 4.7, the FSI, its conditional
standard deviation and the smoothed state probabilities are depicted over time.
The model indicates that the probability is very high that the French economy
was in a high-stress regime during the oil crisis, the 1982 recession, the burst of
the dotcom bubble, the recent global financial crisis and the European sovereign
debt crisis.
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Figure 4.7: Markov-Switching model FSI France
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In figure 4.8, we present the impulse response functions for the change in
industrial production to a shock in the financial stress index. The feedback of
financial stress differs considerably between regimes. While there is no signifi-
cant change in industrial production in response to a financial stress shock in a
low-stress regime, the shock in financial stress has great and persistent negative
effects on industrial production in a high-stress regime. This finding is in line
with studies for other countries and highlights the importance of nonlinearities
in a crisis situation.
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Figure 4.8: Impulse response functions: BVAR model
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4.5 Conclusion
In recent years, several papers have found a negative relationship between fi-
nancial stress and economic activity. This study complements these papers
by offering a useful financial stress index that is available in real time and is
constructed using a sophisticated modeling approach. More precisely, in this
chapter, we construct a financial stress index (FSI) for France that can be used
in real time to evaluate financial stability in the French financial system. We
construct the index using 17 financial variables. From these variables, we ex-
tract a common stress component using a dynamic approximate factor model.
The model is estimated with a combined maximum-likelihood and Expectation
Maximization algorithm, allowing for mixed frequencies and an arbitrary pat-
tern of missing data. Subsequently, we test how the index relates to economic
activity. Against this background, we set up a Markov-Switching Bayesian Vec-
tor Autoregressive Model (MSBVAR). In particular, we impose two regimes on
the model, one low-stress and one high-stress regime, and analyze whether the
transmission of financial stress on economic activity depends on the respective
state.
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The financial stress index fairly indicates important events in French history.
It soars when liquidity premia, risk spreads and uncertainty measures increase
sharply. Therefore, the index can capture systemic events when a batch of
indicators shows signs of financial market tensions.
We find evidence that one regime is not sufficient to model economic ac-
tivity within this model setup. A two-regime model delivers results that are
significantly more appropriate and are able to capture the nonlinearities in
the model. Furthermore, the estimation results indicate that financial stress
transmits very strongly to economic activity when the economy is in a high-
stress regime, whereas economic activity remains nearly unaltered in a low-stress
regime. These findings are robust across different identification schemes within
the BVAR model.
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C Appendix
C.1 Table and Figures
Table C1: Data description
Indicators Native frequency First observation
Banking indicators
TED-spread monthly 1973M01
Money market spread daily 1999M01
β of banking sector daily 1980M03
Banking sector equity index daily 1986M06
Expected Lending quarterly 2003M01
CDS on banking sector monthly 2007M01
Banking sector volatility daily 1986M06
Capital market indicators
Term spread monthly 1976M01
Corporate credit spread monthly 2003M01
Housing credit spread monthly 1990M01
Consumer credit spread monthly 2003M01
CAC 40 log-returns daily 1970M01
Stock market historical volatility daily 1970M01
Government bonds spread daily 1987M12
CDS on corporate sector monthly 2008M01
CDS on 10Y government bonds daily 2007M12
Foreign exchange indicators
Nominal synthetic exchange rate volatility daily 1980M01
Source: European Central Bank, Banque de France, Thomson Financial Datastream,
own calculations.
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Figure C1: Impulse response functions: high-stress regime
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Figure C2: Impulse response functions: low-stress regime
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CHAPTER5
International transmission of financial
stress: evidence from a GVAR1
5.1 Introduction
The financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 had a widespread impact on
countries all over the world. While advanced economies were directly exposed to
the events in the wake of the default of Lehman Brothers, also financial markets
in the emerging economies were negatively affected. In nearly all countries,
stock markets plummeted, bank stocks came under pressure due to systemic
risk, and volatilities on stock markets and foreign exchange markets increased
significantly.
While there is a vast growing literature of analyzing the role of financial con-
ditions and financial stress during these events, relatively little research has
been undertaken to investigate the global perspective of financial stress. This
chapter tries to contribute closing this gap, by taking a global perspective of
financial stress and its spillover effects between countries. We investigate the
international transmission channels of financial stress by analyzing how finan-
cial stress events propagate to the economy in various countries. In order to
shed light on these international macro-financial linkages, we construct financial
stress indexes (FSIs) for 20 countries and investigate the relationship to main
macroeconomic variables. Using the FSIs, we employ a Global VAR model,
originally developed by Pesaran et al. (2004), and investigate the propagation
of financial stress shocks. We find that financial stress quickly spreads interna-
tionally and has a lagged but persistent negative effect on industrial produc-
1This chapter is based on: Dovern and van Roye (2013). International transmission of
financial stress: evidence from a GVAR. Kiel Working Paper No. 1844, The Kiel Institute
for the World Economy.
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tion. Likewise, a shock to financial stress that is solely originated in the United
States transmits quickly to financial markets in other countries and also incurs
a lagged but persistent economic contraction. These findings are in line with
other studies that investigate the impact of international housing shocks and
find persistent effects on real economic activity after housing and financial crises
(Jannsen (2010), Cesa-Bianchi (2012) and Claessens et al. (2012)).
Measuring financial stress has become more and more prominent in recent
years. Central banks and international organizations, private banks and eco-
nomic research institutes have constructed financial stress indexes to assess the
state of financial stability and to identify potential systemic risk at an early
stage. Among the first, Illing and Liu (2006) constructed a FSI for Canada for
providing a "snapshot" of the current degree of stress in the financial system.
Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and Kliesen and Smith (2010) constructed financial
stress indexes for the United States, which are regularly referred to by the Fed-
eral Reserve.2 The European Central Bank periodically publishes a Composite
Indicator for Systemic Stress (CISS) as a tool for its macroprudential monitor-
ing.3 The CISS consists of variables from the money, equity, bond, and foreign
exchange market and summarizes the market specific sub-indexes in one com-
posite index for the euro area. Also for other countries financial stress indexes
were established as a thermometer of the financial system.4
In addition to a simple measure of financial stability, also the role of financial
stress for economic dynamics has gained center stage in recent years. Several
studies find that financial stress reduces economic activity significantly. Most of
these studies investigate the effects of financial stress on economic activity in the
United States. While Hakkio and Keeton (2009) show that increases in financial
stress lead to persistent business cycle downturns when the financial system is
under stress, Hubrich and Tetlow (2012) support their results, employing a
Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (MSBVAR) model. They
show that financial stress events leads to a strong economic contraction and
2The indexes can be downloaded on the Federal Reserve’s webpages: KCFSI and STLFSI.
3The CISS was constructed by Holló et al. (2012) and is published on the website of the
European Central Bank as a macroprudential risk indicator of the European Stability and
Risk Board: CISS.
4Cardarelli et al. (2011) develop FSIs for a variety of countries which were also used for
analysis of the IMF World Economic Outlook. van Roye (2013) and Aboura and van Roye
(2013) constructed a FSI for Germany and for France using a very broad selection of financial
variables over a long time horizon.
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that conventional monetary policy is only little effective in this regime. Mittnik
and Semmler (2013) employ a multi-regime vector autoregression (MRVAR)
approach, to capture the regime-dependency and size-dependency of financial
stress shock. By employing the financial stress index constructed by the IMF,
they find that large negative shocks to financial stress have sizable positive
effects on real activity and support the idea of unconventional monetary policy
measures in cases of extreme financial stress.
Beyond the studies for the United States, the relationship between finan-
cial stress and economic activity has been investigated also for other countries.
Aboura and van Roye (2013) develop a financial stress index for France, con-
sisting of 17 financial variables, and analyze the impact of financial stress on
economic activity. They find evidence for a two-regime economy; i.e. a high
stress regime when financial stress has a negative effect on economic activity
and a low stress regime when financial stress does not incur any significant effect
on the business cycle. An alternative approach to model these regime depen-
dencies, is developed by van Roye (2013). Using a threshold VAR model, he
estimates a threshold above which financial stress significantly affects economic
activity in Germany. Cevik et al. (2012) analyze the relationship between fi-
nancial stress on economic activity in transition countries. They use a linear
bivariate VAR to show that financial stress dampens industrial production in
these countries.
While there is a there is a vast literature on country-specific analysis, the
international transmission of financial stress has been only analyzed scarcely.
Balakrishnan et al. (2009) were the first who analyzed the transmission of fi-
nancial stress between countries. They use a common time-varying component
in the FSIs for emerging markets and its relationship to the FSIs in advanced
economies and other global factors. Furthermore, they employ a two stage
econometric analysis of monthly financial stress co-movement using a country-
by-country approach and an annual panel data analysis of determinants of fi-
nancial stress. They find that financial stress spreads quickly from advanced
economies to emerging markets with a high pass-through.
This chapter contributes to the literature in several dimensions. First, we
construct a comprehensive measure of financial stress for 20 countries that is
available in real time. Second, we show that the correlation of financial stress
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across countries is particularly high during financial crises. Third, we show
that countries that are financially open exhibit stronger correlation of financial
stress to other countries than do countries that have relatively higher restric-
tions on financial openness. Finally, we show how financial stress propagates
internationally and how it impacts the business cycles of the sample countries.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 characterizes the concep-
tual methodology that is used to construct the financial stress indexes, shortly
describes the data and the estimation technique, and finally presents the fi-
nancial stress indexes for all countries. We identify important country-specific
and global financial stress events and analyze how financial stress is correlated
between countries. Section 5.3 describes the GVAR model and investigates how
financial stress is transmitted internationally and how it dampens economic
activity. Section 5.4 briefly concludes.
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5.2 Measuring financial stress: Constructing
financial stress indexes
Financial stress is unobservable but presumably reflected in many financial vari-
ables. As Illing and Liu (2006) point out, financial stress may be defined as the
force exerted on economic agents by uncertainty and changing expectations of
a loss in financial markets and its institutions behind. Given this definition, we
primarily focus on measures of uncertainty on financial markets. In particular,
we include a measures for aggregate stock market volatility as an indicator for
aggregate market uncertainty, the volatility of bank equities as an indicator of
uncertainty in the banking sector (a proxy of systemic risk), and foreign ex-
change rate volatility that indicates pressures on foreign exchange markets. To
capture all these features, we construct single composite indexes containing a
broad measure of potential misalignments on these markets. In particular, we
use a dynamic approximate factor model and interpret the single factor as the
measure of financial stress.
5.2.1 Methodology
To extract a common stress component of the financial variables, we apply
a dynamic approximate factor model. The methodology is similar to that in
Banbura and Modugno (2012) and van Roye (2013). In particular, we set up a
model that has the following form:
yt = Λft + εt, where εt ∼ iid N (0, C), (5.1)
where yt is a vector of stationary and standardized endogenous financial vari-
ables, ft is a single common latent factor, and Λ is a n × 1 vector of the time
series’ factor loadings. The values in the factor loading vector represent the
extent to which each financial variable time series is affected by the common
factor. The financial stress index is then given by FSIt = ft. The n× 1 vector
εt represents the idiosyncratic component which is allowed to be slightly corre-
lated both serially at all leads and lags and cross-sectionally.5 The idiosyncratic
errors are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and the diago-
nal variance-covariance matrix C. The advantage of the dynamic approximate
5The weak correlation of the idiosyncratic component (all eigenvalues of E(εtε′t) = Σ are
bounded) makes the factor model "approximate"; see Breitung and Eickmeier (2006).
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factor model is that it ensures that the idiosyncratic component is not too re-
strictive in the case of large cross-sections (Stock and Watson (2002)). The
dynamics of the latent factor ft are described in the transition equation, i.e.:
ft = Aft−1 + ξt, where ξt ∼ iid N (0, D), (5.2)
where A is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients, capturing the development
of the latent factor ft. Since we aim to estimate the model over a longer time
horizon and for many countries the data availability is limited, we choose an
estimation methodology that can appropriately deal with missing data. In
particular, we estimate the model using a combined maximum likelihood and
Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm approach. Originally proposed by
Dempster et al. (1977) this method serves as a general solution for models where
the likelihood is hardly tractable because of incomplete or hidden data. Com-
pared to non-parametric methods based on principal components, the method-
ology we use has the advantage that we can deal with an arbitrary pattern of
missing data and it is more efficient for small samples (Banbura and Modugno
(2012)).
5.2.2 Data
In order to compute the FSI, we use 5 indicators for each country. These
indicators can individually be interpreted as a measure for financial stress in a
specific sector and are well established in the literature when analyzing financial
stress (Illing and Liu (2006), Holló et al. (2012), Cardarelli et al. (2011), Misina
and Tkacz (2009), and Duca and Peltonen (2011). In particular, we focus on
financial stress in the banking sector, on bond markets, and on foreign exchange
markets. We illustrate a brief overview of the employed indicators and the
contsruction method in table 5.1.
To develop a measure for stress in the banking sector, we construct a volatility
index of bank equity. We take the equity index of the countries’ most important
financial institutions provided by Thomson Reuters Professional Datastream.
Using the bank equity monthly returns, we construct a historical volatility mea-
sure by estimating a GARCH(1,1) model. For aggregate financial market un-
certainty, we use a GARCH(1,1) model of the countries’ main stock market
returns. In addition, we take the inverse of the three month moving-average
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stock market returns as an indicator for financial market losses. To express
financial stress on government bond markets, we construct a volatility measure
using a GARCH(1,1) model of a government bond index returns that are pro-
vided by Thomson Reuters Professional Datastream.6 Finally, we calculate a
monthly volatility index for the real effective exchange rate to map financial
stress on foreign exchange markets. To do this, we use a GARCH(1,1) model
of the real effective exchange rate returns.
Table 5.1: Indicators, construction method and market segment
Indicator Construction method Market segment
Stock market volatility GARCH(1,1) model of
month-to-month stock
market returns
Stock market
Exchange rate volatility GARCH(1,1) model of
month-to-month real
effective exchange rate
returns
Foreign exchange mar-
ket
Stock market returns Negative values of
the 3-month moving-
average stock market
returns
Stock market
Government bond volatility GARCH(1,1) model of
month-to-month gov-
ernment bond yields
Bond market
Banking sector volatility GARCH(1,1) model
of month-to-month
returns on bank
equity
Stock market
6An alternative measure to express stress on government bond markets would be to take
government bond spreads vis-à-vis a risk-free benchmark bond. However, since government
bond yields are not directly comparable between countries and it is difficult to identify a
risk-free government bond currently, we rather chose this volatility index.
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5.2.3 The financial stress indexes
In figure 5.1 the financial stress indexes for all considered countries are illus-
trated. In addition, we report an external financial stress index that is calcu-
lated by taking a trade-weighted average of financial stress in all other countries.
Some episodes, during which the financial system was under strain, become im-
mediately evident when considering the FSI for each country. Depending on
the country, the amplitude during these events significantly differ. The first
episode of high financial stress in our data sample occurs during the oil crisis
in 1973-1974. During this crisis financial stress increased especially in the ad-
vanced economies, which were primarily dependent on oil. The second period of
high financial stress occurred during the increasingly restrictive monetary policy
of the Federal Reserve during the years 1980-1982. This financial stress event
was primarily triggered by a restrictive monetary stance in the United States,
accompanied by steep cuts in government spending under the Reagan admin-
istration. Although many countries dropped into a recession, the magnitude of
financial stress remained rather limited, especially in the United States.
The next remarkable peak of financial stress was due to the stock market
crash in 1987. On Monday, 19 October 1987 stock markets all over the world
plummeted. The Dow Jones dropped by about 23 percent in one day. Until the
end of October, the stock market index of Canada decreased by more than 20
percent, of Australia by more than 40 percent, and of Hong Kong by even more
than 45 percent.
Compared to these large amplitudes during the 1987 stock market crash, the
collapse of the Soviet Union had a very tiny impact on financial stress. Similarly,
the crisis of the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in 1992-1993 had
only a very regional effect. In particular, only European countries, such as the
United Kingdom, Italy, France and Spain were directly exposed to the sharp
corrections of their currencies with respect to the Deutschmark. On a global
scale, the ERM crisis had almost no effect on financial markets. This becomes
evident when considering the FSI for the United States, Canada, Australia or
China. The Tequila crisis in Mexico 1995 and the Argentinian crisis in 2002
are good examples for domestic crises, which had a large impact on Mexico and
Argentina but had no major repercussions on other countries.
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Figure 5.1: Financial stress indexes
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Notes: Blue solid line: Domestic financial stress index; red dashed-dotted line: external
(trade-weighted) financial stress index; the FSI consist of respectively 5 different variables
that represent financial stress. The FSI are constructed using a dynamic approximate factor
model.
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The next global financial stress event was the outbreak of the Asian and Rus-
sian crisis and the associated default of the large hedge fund Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM)in 1997-1998. For the Asian economies, the Asian crisis
is the largest peak of financial stress in our analysis. Especially in South Korea
financial stress rose to very high levels. The Brazilian crisis, which immediately
connected to the events in Russia and Asia, led to widespread strains in the fi-
nancial system in Latin American countries. In particular, it was the beginning
of the persistent turmoil in Argentina, which culminated in a sharp financial
crisis in 2002.
The legacy with the burst of the dotcom bubble was another event when
financial stress was present in many countries all over the world. Most notably
financial markets in Germany and in Italy were affected significantly by sharp
corrections in stock markets. The most significant peak over the sample period
was clearly the recent financial crisis. Nearly all indicators from all market
segments point to a sharp increase in financial stress in almost all countries.
While the amplitude in several emerging market economies is not exceptionally
high, mainly the advanced economies were exposed to extraordinary high levels
of financial stress. The European sovereign debt crisis led mainly to financial
stress increases in European countries, such as Spain and Italy, while it remained
subdued in the rest of the world. This emphasizes that the crisis in the euro area
still remains a crisis within the euro area and, up to now, has not substantially
affected the currency area as a whole.
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5.2.4 Correlation of financial stress
To gain insights of how financial stress co-moves across countries, we carry out
a correlation analysis. First, we compute an average cross-correlation among all
countries over the sample period. Second, we examine how financial openness
is a factor that contributes to an exposure of financial stress. Third, we report
country-specific bivariate correlation statistics to analyze between which coun-
tries the financial cycle is mostly synchronized. For the average cross-country
correlation we compute pair-wise contemporaneous cross-correlations of the FSI
over the sample period. Particularly, we compute a 24-month moving average
of the contemporaneous correlations between 1970 and 2012. The correlations
are calculated as follows: ρt = 1N−1
∑N
i=iCorr(FSIi,[t−12,t+12], FSIj,[t−12,t+12]),
where N = 20 represents the number of countries. The results from the corre-
lation analysis are graphically illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Average cross-correlations of financial stress
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Notes: The cross-correlation is computed by taking a 24-month moving average of
the contemporaneous bivariate pairwise FSIs. In particular, the computation is: ρt =
1
N−1
∑i=1
N Corr(FSIi,[t−12,t+12], FSIj,[t−12,t+12])
The results of the cross-country correlation analysis are twofold. First, the
increasing trend in the cross-country correlation financial stress emphasizes the
vigorous growth in international financial integration. In general, financial cy-
cles tend to co-move more among countries over time. Second, the synchroniza-
tion of financial stress among countries varies significantly over time. There
tends to be a strong co-movement in financial stress in selected stress episodes
that reflect global financial stress events, such as the 1973-1974 oil crisis, the
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1987 stock market crash, the Asian and Russian crisis 1997-1998, the legacy of
the dotcom bubble burst and most prominently the recent financial crisis.
When considering the relationship between financial openness and the corre-
lation of financial stress to other countries, the results indicate that financial
openness is an important factor to explain differences in the co-movement of
financial stress across countries (Figure 5.3).7 We find a significant positive
relationship (p-value of the slope: 0.0001) between the degree of financial open-
ness and the correlation of financial stress among countries. While there is
only little correlation of financial stress in countries that have a low degree of
financial openness, the financially high integrated countries exhibit strong cor-
relation of financial stress. It stands out that correlation of financial stress in
emerging markets is relatively low and over the sample period these countries
were financially closed. In particular, Brazil, Turkey, Argentina, China and
Korea stand out with a low correlation of financial stress and low values in
financial openness. In contrast, countries with high financial openness, such as
the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands exhibit
a strong correlation with the financial stress indexes of the other countries. A
single outlier in the sample is South Africa, which has a low degree of financial
openness over the sample period, but exhibits a strong correlation of financial
stress with the other countries.
The lower exposure of emerging markets to global financial stress events also
becomes evident when analyzing the country-specific cross-correlations of finan-
cial stress (Table 5.2). The financial cycle in emerging markets exhibits a dif-
ferent pattern than the financial cycle in the advanced economies. For instance,
the degree of correlation of financial stress in Argentina, Mexico and Korea with
other countries is on average by far lower than the correlation of Germany, the
United Kingdom or the United States. While there is also a clear regional de-
pendency of financial stress correlation, such as the high correlation of financial
stress between Argentina and Brazil, Korea and China, Spain and France, the
7As an indicator for financial openness we use the Chinn-Ito index, a de jure measure of
financial openness, which measures a country’s degree of capital account openness. The index
was originally introduced in Chinn and Ito (2006). Given that the degree of financial openness
does not change very often over time, we use an average degree of financial integration from
1970 until 2011. For emerging markets, where financial markets developed substantially over
the past decade, this measure might leave out the recent change in financial integration of
these countries.
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Figure 5.3: Correlation of financial stress and financial openness
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
Financial Openness
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
o
f
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
st
re
ss
 
 
y = 0.066x + 0.36
AUS
UK
JP
GER
CN
US
SW
SA
CH
KO
AG
TK
BR
MX
SD
IT
ES
FR
AU
NL
Notes: The correlation of financial stress is expressed as country-specific correlations of
the domestic FSI with all other FSIs ( 1N−1
∑N
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correlation of financial stress in the United States with all other countries is in
general very high. This supports the presumption that the United States are
the most important propagator of financial shocks in the world economy.
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5.3 Financial stress and economic activity:
Evidence from a GVAR model
In order to investigate the international transmission channels of financial stress,
we use a GVAR model framework. Originally established by Pesaran et al.
(2004), it was, amongst others, further developed by Dées et al. (2009) and
Dées et al. (2010). GVAR models can be used to analyze international inter-
dependencies among countries and the transmission channels of international
shocks.
This type of model has been used to analyze for example the international
transmission of oil price shocks (Cashin et al. (2012)), housing price shocks
(Cesa-Bianchi (2012)), credit supply shocks (Eickmeier and Ng (2011)), cost-
push shocks (Galesi and Lombardi (2009)), and liquidity shocks during the
Great Recession of 2007-2009 (Chudik and Fratzscher (2011)).
5.3.1 The GVAR framework
In what follows, we present a very brief sketch of the GVAR model. For a de-
tailed description of the methodology we refer to Smith and Galesi (2011). The
GVAR model basically consists of a number of VAR models for each individual
country that are linked to each other via a weighting matrix, which is based
on trade weights in our model. For each country i = 1, . . . , N the VAR(pi, qi)
model links a ki× 1 vector of domestic variables xit to a k∗i × 1 vector of foreign
variables x∗it; these foreign variables are assumed to be weakly exogenous in the
country VAR model. In addition, we allow for a constant and a deterministic
trend in the VAR models:
xit = a0i+a1it+Ψ1ixi,t−1+. . .+Ψpiixi,t−pi+Λ1ix∗i,t−1+. . .+Λqiix∗i,t−qi+ui,t, (5.3)
where the Ψi,n and Λi,n are ki× ki and ki× k∗i coefficient matrices connected to
the domestic and foreign variables respectively, a0i is a ki×1 vector of constant
terms, a1i is a ki × 1 vector of slope coefficients, and ut is a ki × 1 vector of
country-specific shocks that are assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean
zero and a constant covariance matrix Σi.
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The country-specific variables are constructed as trade weighted averages
across the domestic variables of all countries, i. e. x∗it =
∑N
i=1wijxjt, with
wii = 0 and sum over all w = 1. In our empirical implementation we use
fixed trade weights that are computed as an average of the weights over the
sample period. These country-specific VAR models can be transformed into
error correction form and separately estimated on a case-by-case basis taking
potential cointegration between xit and x∗it into account.8
In a second step, they are grouped together and the GVAR is solved globally,
i. e. jointly for all countries, since from a global perspective all variables are
endogenous to the GVAR as a whole. To this end, all country-specific vectors
with endogenous variables are stacked into xt = [x′1t, x′2t, . . . , x′Nt]′, which is of
dimension k∗ = ∑Ni=1 ki. It can be shown that using the appropriate weight
matrices and stacking the equations of all country-specific VAR models yields
G0xt = a0 + a1t+G1xt−1 + . . .+Grxt−r + ut, (5.4)
where r = max{{pi}, {qi}} and the parameters of the Gn are functions of the
weight matrices and the parameters estimated for each of the country-specific
VAR models.9 Since G0 is known, one can premultiply equation (5.4) by G−10
to obtain the GVAR model as
xt = b0 + b1t+ F1xt−1 + . . .+ Frxt−r + t, (5.5)
with b0 = G−10 a0, b1 = G−10 a1, F1 = G−10 G1, . . . , Fr = G−10 Gr, and  = G−10 ut.
There are no a-priory restrictions placed on the covariance matrix of the vector
of shocks Et(t′t) and the GVAR can basically be treated like an ordinary VAR
model for most purposes.
5.3.2 Computing GIRFs for the GVAR model
In this chapter, we use generalized impulse response functions (GIRF; Pesaran
and Shin (1998)) to analyze the dynamics of the international transmission of
financial stress. Though intellectually not satisfying we constrain our analysis
to the use of GIRFs as opposed to the identification of true structural shocks,
8See Smith and Galesi (2011) for a detailed description of the estimation procedure and
a battery of diagnostic tests for the VAR models.
9For details, see Smith and Galesi (2011), p.98.
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because for a GVAR with usually dozens of endogenous variables there is no
good way to place enough meaningful restrictions to identify what could be
called a structural GVAR.10 If ut is assumed to have a multivariate normal
distribution the GIRFs for a standardized shock of one standard deviation at
time t0 to the lth equation of the GVAR corresponding to the jth variable of the
GVAR at time t0+n is given by the jth element of
GIRF (xt;ult, n) =
e′AnG−10
∑
u el√
e′l
∑
u el
, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , l; j = 1, 2, . . . , k, (5.6)
where el is a vector of dimension k∗ with a 1 as the lth element and zeros
otherwise if one wants to simulate the responses to a country-specific shock.
In case of a global shock to a specific type of variable (e. g. financial stress
as analyzed below) el has PPP GDP weights that sum to one at the positions
of the specific variables in the GVAR and zero elements otherwise. An can be
computed recursively by using
As = F1As−1 + F2As−2 + · · ·+ FpAs−r, s = 1, 2, . . . (5.7)
with A0 = Im, As = 0, for s < 0.
These GIRFs are invariant to the ordering of the variables (and countries) in
the GVAR but they are not interpretable in a structural sense, since the error
terms are not orthogonalized.
5.3.3 Empirical GVAR specification
We implement the GVAR that we use to analyze the international transmission
of financial stress on the basis of monthly data about (log) industrial production,
the (log) price level (CPI), the short-term policy rate11, and the measure of
financial stress that was presented in section 5.2. We use a balanced sample
covering the time between February 1991 and December 2012. The lag orders
of the country-specific VAR models are restricted to a maximum of pi = 2
10In some settings it has been argued that sign-restrictions (Uhlig (2005)) can be an ap-
propriate method to identify structural shocks in GVAR models (see e. g. Cashin et al.
(2012)).
11The policy rate is transformed as 0.25× ln(1+Rt/100) to deal with the very high interest
rate levels in some of the emerging economies of our sample during the early period of our
sample.
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and qi = 2 for all countries to ensure stability of the GVAR.12 The number of
cointegration vectors for each country model is determined using the maximum
eigenvalue statistic with an upper limit of 2. The model was estimated using
RATS 8.2.
To shed light on the international transmission of financial stress, and on the
dynamics of financial stress that is caused in the different countries by major
shocks to the world economy, we simulate GIRFs for the following shocks:
• a global shock to financial stress (using PPP GDP weights as discussed
in the previous section);
• a US shock to financial stress
• a (negative) shock to industrial production in the US.
The GIRFs are computed for 36 months and median responses as well as con-
fidence bands are based on bootstrap simulations with 250 replications.
12For a cointegrated GVAR the roots of the determinantal equation of the companion
matrix of the model should lie inside or on the unit circle. Apparently, it is a common feature
that GVAR models with a richer lag structure show an explosive behavior and are not well
suited for dynamical analysis.
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5.3.4 Results
A global financial stress shock
Figures 5.4.a and 5.4.b show the dynamic responses of the level of financial
stress and industrial production respectively to a standardized global shock to
financial stress. Financial stress significantly increases on impact in all countries
and – with the exception of a few countries such as China, France, Japan, or
the Netherlands – remains high quite persistently.
Industrial production is negatively affected in all countries – though not signif-
icantly in all of them. In most cases the maximum impact is reached with a lag
of approximately one year. The countries that are least affected in terms of pro-
duction losses are Australia, China, and surprisingly the United Kingdom. The
strongest effects can be expected in Germany, Turkey, and the United States.
In these cases, the economic contraction is very persistent and the production
level remains significantly below its initial level after 3 years. In South Korea,
global financial stress seems to have only a transitory effect. After a sharp con-
traction on impact (almost 0.7 percent), the economy recovers quickly after the
shock and industrial production reaches its initial level after 10 months.
To demonstrate how devastating financial stress can be for economic activity,
we re-scale the size of the shock to financial stress in such a way that it matches
the experience of the most recent financial crises. To this end, we pick the
US as the reference country. During the crisis our measure of financial stress
increased by about 8 points in the US which is about 20 times larger than
the initial reaction in response to the standardized global shock. Based on our
simulation results this would translate to a fall in industrial production of about
8 percent.13
13In reality, industrial production fell by about 17 percent between Dec. 2007 and Jun.
2009. Thus, the relatively parsimoniously specified GVAR accounts for about 50 percent of
the decline.
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Figure 5.4.a: Generalized impulse responses for financial stress to a global fi-
nancial stress shock
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Notes: The solid blue line represents the mean impulse response, the dashed-dotted blue
line the median impulse response, and the dashed red lines represent the 66 percent bias-
corrected bootstrap error bands.
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Figure 5.4.b: Generalized impulse responses for industrial production to a
global financial stress shock
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Notes: The solid blue line represents the mean impulse response, the dashed-dotted blue
line the median impulse response, and the dashed red lines represent the 66 percent bias-
corrected bootstrap error bands.
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A US financial stress shock
To investigate how financial stress is transmitted internationally when the orig-
inal shock is limited to a single country, we plot GIRFs of financial stress and
industrial production corresponding to a standardized shock to financial stress
in the US in Figures 5.5.a and 5.5.b. 14
The transmission of financial stress in the United States to the financial sys-
tem in other countries is in most cases unambiguous. An increase of the FSI in
the United States leads to a persistent increase of financial stress in the other
countries – though not significantly so in some cases, such as Mexico or South
Korea. The increase of financial stress outside the US is, however, much smaller
than the initial shock inside the US. On average, the maximum increase is less
than half the size of the standardized shock to financial stress in the US. On
average, the GIRFs show a hump-shaped responses indicating that the trans-
mission takes some time; on average the largest impact of financial stress in the
other countries is reached after 3 to 4 months. There are some countries, how-
ever, that are most heavily affected almost at impact. Examples are Australia,
Canada and Japan which presumably have very close financial ties with the US.
The propagation of financial stress in the United States to economic activity
in other countries is quite strong. Industrial production declines persistently in
almost all countries. Surprisingly the output losses are as high as those in the
US in many cases although the effect on financial stress in other countries is
more limited. This indicates that a considerable part of the adverse effect on
economic activity is not transmitted via financial markets directly but rather
indirectly via a fall in foreign demand from the US. Similarly to the transmission
of financial stress, industrial production reacts with a considerable time lag in
many countries. This indicates that financial stress in the United States does not
have an immediate effect on production in other countries but that transmission
takes time.
14This has been arguably been the plot of the financial crisis of 2008-2009 which had its
origins in the turmoils on the financial markets in the US following the burst of the US housing
bubble.
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Figure 5.5.a: Generalized impulse responses for financial stress to a US finan-
cial stress shock
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Notes: The solid blue line represents the mean impulse response, the dashed-dotted blue
line the median impulse response, and the dashed red lines represent the 66 percent bias-
corrected bootstrap error bands.
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Figure 5.5.b: Generalized impulse responses for industrial production to a neg-
ative shock in industrial production in the US
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Notes: The solid blue line represents the mean impulse response, the dashed-dotted blue
line the median impulse response, and the dashed red lines represent the 66 percent bias-
corrected bootstrap error bands.
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A shock to US industrial production
Figures 5.6.a and 5.6.b show how industrial production and financial stress
behave in response to a shock to industrial production in the US. In the United
States a fair amount of financial stress is triggered by the slowdown in economic
activity which fades only slowly. The rise of financial stress in other countries
is much smaller – with the exception of the direct neighbor Canada where the
level of financial stress is also strongly affected. Surprisingly, the stress level in
neither Mexico nor China – two major trading partners of the United States –
are significantly affected following the shock to economic activity in the United
States. In most other countries the response of economic activity is lagged and
the highest negative effect is often reached not until after six to twenty months.
In the United States, industrial production recovers gradually from the initial
drop of activity. In other countries, the demand shock triggers a slowdown
in industrial production such that the level declines persistently. For some
countries, such as the United Kingdom and Japan, the economic contraction is
not significant. The strongest effect of an economic contraction in the United
States can be expected in Germany and Italy, where the level of industrial
productions falls by approximately 0.2 percent after one year.
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Figure 5.6.a: Generalized impulse responses for financial stress to a negative
shock in industrial production in the US
10 20 30
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Argentina
10 20 30
0
0.02
0.04
Australia
10 20 30
0.05
0.1
0.15
Austria
10 20 30
−0.05
0
0.05
Brazil
10 20 30
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Canada
10 20 30
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
China
10 20 30
0
0.05
0.1
France
10 20 30
0
0.05
0.1
Germany
10 20 30
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Italy
10 20 30
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Japan
10 20 30
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Mexico
10 20 30
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Netherlands
10 20 30
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
South Africa
10 20 30
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
South Korea
10 20 30
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Spain
10 20 30
0
0.05
0.1
Sweden
10 20 30
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Switzerland
10 20 30
0
0.05
0.1
Turkey
10 20 30
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
United Kingdom
10 20 30
0.05
0.1
0.15
United States
Notes: The solid blue line represents the mean impulse response, the dashed-dotted blue
line the median impulse response, and the dashed red lines represent the 66 percent bias-
corrected bootstrap error bands.
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Figure 5.6.b: Generalized impulse responses for industrial production to a neg-
ative shock in industrial production in the US
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Notes: The solid blue line represents the mean impulse response, the dashed-dotted blue
line the median impulse response, and the dashed red lines represent the 66 percent bias-
corrected bootstrap error bands.
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5.4 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the international transmission of financial stress and its
effects on economic activity for 20 countries. Using a dynamic approximate fac-
tor model, we construct country-specific financial stress indexes (FSI) from 1970
until 2012 on a monthly basis. The FSI are composed by financial indicators
such as volatilities on stock markets, bond markets and the foreign exchange
market. The FSIs succeed in signaling exceptional events that occurred on fi-
nancial markets in the recent past. An empirical investigation shows that the
correlation of financial stress across countries increased notably over the past
four decades. Furthermore, the cross-country correlation of financial stress is
particularly high during global financial crises. In addition, financial stress is
stronger correlated in countries with a high degree of financial openness.
Subsequently, we estimate a GVAR model to analyze the international trans-
mission of financial stress and the propagation of financial stress on economic
activity. We show that financial stress significantly reduces economic activity;
the negative effects are persistent and the maximum impact lags the shock to
financial stress by about one year. Likewise, a shock to financial stress in the
United States spreads quickly to financial markets in other countries and has
a lagged but persistent effect on economic activity in the other countries. Fur-
thermore, we find that a slowdown in economic activity (demonstrated by a
shock to industrial production in the US) leads to a sustained increase in fi-
nancial stress in most countries of our sample. The effects in this direction are
not so large, however, that a financial crisis could be triggered by a prototype
recession alone.
Our results indicate that financial stress should be a major concern when
analyzing international business cycles. In addition, the result have important
implication for economic policy. Because of the strong economic impact of
financial shocks, the results implicate that monitoring of financial stress should
be of interest for both monetary and fiscal policy makers. Since the financial
cycle and the business cycle are significantly synchronized internationally, it
is crucial to consider the global dimension of financial stress even from the
perspective of a national policy maker.
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D Appendix
D.1 Data and economic history
In this section we describe important events in all considered countries and we
show how the FSI relates to these events. For each country, we present the FSI
as well as the data that we include in the estimation. In addition, we identify
major events using short tables and shortly describe them for each country.
Argentina
Figure D1: FSI and stress components for Argentina
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
After a decade of economic stagnation and high inflation rates, Argentina fell
into hyperinflation in 1989, which lasted until the convertibility plan of the do-
mestic currency was introduced. The convertibility plan, which was put in place
in April 1991, fixed the domestic currency to the U.S. Dollar at par in order
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to restrict monetary policy to be expansionary. It was designed to stabilize the
economy through drastic, and almost irreversible, measures. Soon afterward
the financial system in Argentina stabilized and the economy began to recover
quite quickly. The Mexican Peso crisis (Tequila crisis) in 1994-1995 and the
Asian and Russian crisis had relatively little impact on financial stress in Ar-
gentina. Although output fell sharply and interest rates increased significantly
during these events, the fixed currency regime could be sustained and the up-
coming pressures and uncertainty on stock markets was very limited. Financial
stability was safeguarded throughout this period. The strongest increase in the
FSI is recorded during the Argentinian crisis, when a run on commercial banks
tirggered one of the severest crises in the country’s history. All indicators in-
cluded in the Argentinian FSI contributed to an increase in the FSI. The recent
global financial crisis also affected Argentina, but to a much lesser extent than
the crisis in 2002.
Table D1: Selected events in Argentinean economic history
1980-1989 Stagflation
1982 LDC crisis
1989 Hyperinflation
April 1991 Introduction of convertibility plan
1995 Mexican Peso crisis (Tequila crisis)
1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
January 1999 Devaluation of the Brazilian Real
December 2001 Partial deposit freeze
2002 "Argentinian" crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
Notes: LDC: Less-developed countries; LTCM: Long Term Capital Management.
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Australia
Figure D2: FSI and stress components for Australia
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
Australia experienced three episodes of financial stress. The first episode
occurred during the first oil crisis in 1973-1974 and the second episode during
the global stock market crash in 1987, when the FSI reached its highest level.
During the third period, the recent global financial crisis, financial stress only
rose slightly, because Australia was only marginally exposed to the turbulence
on financial markets in other countries.
Table D2: Selected events in Australian economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis
1987 Global stock market crash
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
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Austria
Figure D3: FSI and stress components for Austria
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
Table D3: Selected events in Austrian economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis
1990-1992 German reunification / Collapse of Soviet regime
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis
Notes: LTCM: Long Term Capital Management.
Austria experienced three periods of financial stress in the sample period.
While financial stress was relatively subdued during the oil crisis 1973-1974, it
significantly increased in the wake of the German reunification and the collapse
of the Soviet regime from 1990 until 1992. Afterward, the Asian crisis led
to a relatively sharp increase in the index. The highest stress in Austria was
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during the recent global financial crisis. Compared to this crisis, the European
sovereign debt crisis affected financial markets in Austria only slightly.
Brazil
Figure D4: FSI and stress components for Brazil
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The first financial stress events for Brazil that we can identify is the currency
reform (Plano Real) in 1994 and the Mexican Peso crisis in 1995. During the
Peso crisis, Brazil’s trade deficit widened substantially, and the country had to
bear strong net capital outflows. Economic policy reacted to the developments
by shifting its policy focus primarily to the exchange rate and the trade balance.
The central bank announced interventions on foreign exchange markets with
a narrow band, leading to a strong increase in dollar demand. The policy of
a floating exchange rate regime with fixed nominal upper and lower bounds,
resulted in a 10 percent devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, and was
followed by a subsequent further devaluation under market pressures. At the
same time, the government reversed the policy of rapid trade liberalization,
using trade measures to curb imports, and an attempt was made to slow the
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Table D4: Selected events in Brazilian economic history
1980-1990 Stagflationary period
1981 LDC crisis
1990 Hyperinflation
July 1994 "Plano Real" - Currency reform
1995 Mexican Peso crisis (Tequila crisis)
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
January 1999 Devaluation of the Brazilian Real
2002 "Argentinian" crisis
2008-2009 Financial crisis
Notes: LDC: Less-developed countries; LTCM: Long Term Capital Management.
economy to reduce inflationary pressures and check the deterioration of the
trade balance. The next strong increase in the Brazilian FSI was during the
depreciation of the Brazilian Real in 1999. Financial markets in Brazil were
also highly exposed to the Argentinian crisis in 2002. In contrast, although
financial stress increased noticeably during the global financial crisis, the peak
of the FSI remained substantially lower than in the events that occurred in
Latin American in the decade before.
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Canada
Figure D5: FSI and stress components for Canada
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The financial system in Canada experienced a variety of financial stress events
over the past 40 years. The most significant increases in financial stress were
during the 1987 stock market crash, the Russian and LTCM crisis, and most
importantly the global financial crisis 2008-2009. On Black Friday 1987, the
Canadian stock market index TSE dropped by 17 percent in two trading days.
The banking sector was relatively resilient during these events such that volatil-
ity on bank equities remained subdued. In 1998 during the dramatic losses of
the high leveraged hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), banks
were heavily involved and had to bear large losses. In addition, financial stress in
Canada’s major trading partners rose sharply. During the global financial crisis
all stress components, except government bond volatility, soared and reached
all-time highs. In particular, exchange rate volatility, which had been rela-
tively low over the whole sample period, increased significantly. For a detailed
description of the events of financial stress in Canada see Illing and Liu (2006).
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Table D5: Selected events in Canadian economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis
1981 LDC crises
1987 Stock market crash
1991 Early-1990s bank losses (real estate price collapse)
2001 Terror attacks in the United States
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
Notes: LDC: Less-developed countries; LTCM: Long Term Capital Management.
China
Figure D6: FSI and stress components for China
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
Since financial data for China has a relatively short history, visible movements
in FSI begin at the beginning of the 1990’s.15 We identify the only great finan-
15The time series for the exchange rate volatility goes back further until 1972. However,
the factor loading coefficient for the real exchange rate volatility index is very close to zero,
such that it does not contribute significantly to the FSI.
141
Chapter 5 International transmission of financial stress:
evidence from a GVAR
Table D6: Selected events in Chinese economic history
1997 Asian crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
cial stress event in China during the global financial crisis, when stock market
volatility and banking sector volatility reached record highs. Surprisingly, al-
though stock and bond markets were noticeably affected during the Asian crisis
in 1997, the FSI remains at very low levels, indicating that the financial system
was not very strongly exposed to this event.
France
Figure D7: FSI and stress components for France
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The FSI for France is a relatively volatile index compared with the other
countries in our analysis and points to various financial stress events over the
past four decades. While the oil crisis had a relatively limited impact on finan-
cial stress in France, it soared the first time after the presidential election of
François Mitterand on May 10, 1981. After an announcement of nationalization
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of private companies, the CAC40 dropped by more than 15 percent in just one
day. The next strong increase in financial stress was during the stock market
crash in 1987. One year later, the stock market had lost about 40 percent of its
capitalization. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the crisis of the European
exchange rate mechanism (ERM), when the French Franc came under pressure
led to the next peaks of the FSI. During the Asian and Russian crisis as well
as the collapse of the hedge fund LTCM the FSI increased significantly, partic-
ularly because French banks were involved considerably, such that volatility on
bank equities jumped to a record high.
Table D7: Selected events in French economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis
1981 Stock market panic after presidential election
1981 LDC crisis
1987 Global stock market crash
1991 Collapse of Soviet Union, high political uncertainty
1992-1993 ERM crisis, Pressure on French Franc
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2001 Terror attacks in the United States
2004 Legacy of dotcom bubble
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis
Notes: LDC: Less-developed countries; LTCM: Long Term Capital Management; ERM:
Exchange rate mechanism.
The low stress episode between 1998 and 2001 can be interpreted as investor’s
positive perception of the introduction of the Euro, mainly because exchange
rate risk was reduced notably. The terror attacks in the United States on
September 11, 2001 as well as the legacy of the burst of the dotcom bubble
led to financial stress events, however with a moderate intensity. The highest
peak of the FSI for France was during the global financial crisis 2008-2009. But
also the European sovereign debt crisis led to widespread stress in the financial
system in France, particularly, because government bonds came under pressure
and French banks were strongly involved in crisis countries such as Greece. For
a detailed description of the events of high financial stress in France see Aboura
and van Roye (2013).
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Germany
Figure D8: FSI and stress components for Germany
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The major financial stress events for Germany are the 1987 global stock mar-
ket crash, the legacy of the burst of the dotcom bubble and the global financial
crisis 2008-2009.
While the 1987 crisis and the global financial crisis were also characterized by
a strong increase in financial stress in the main trading partners, financial stress
after the burst of the dotcom bubble was primarily a domestic phenomena. In
particular, the volatility of the German stock market index DAX reached very
high levels during this period. German reunification and the Asian and Russian
crisis led a a slight increase in the index. In contrast, the ERM crisis had
basically no major impact on financial stress in Germany. Along this line, the
European sovereign debt crisis also had only slight effects on financial markets
in Germany. In particular, compared to the crisis countries, government bond
and banking sector volatility remained at low levels. For a detailed description
of the events of high financial stress in Germany see van Roye (2013).
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Table D8: Selected events in German economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis
1987 Global stock market crash
1990-1991 Germany reunification; Collapse of Soviet Union
1992-1993 ERM crisis
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2001 Terror attacks in the United States
2004 Legacy of dotcom bubble
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis
Notes: LTCM: Long Term Capital Management; ERM: Exchange rate mechanism.
Italy
Figure D9: FSI and stress components for Italy
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The FSI for Italy exhibits several peaks over the past four decades. The
strongest increases in the FSI over the sample period was during the LDC crisis
in 1982, the global stock market crash 1987, the ERM crisis , and the global
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Table D9: Selected events in Italian economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis
1981 LDC crisis
1987 Global stock market crash
1990-1991 Germany reunification; Collapse of Soviet Union
1992-1993 ERM crisis
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2001 Terror attacks in the United States
2004 Legacy of dotcom bubble
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis
Notes: LDC: Less-developed countries; LTCM: Long Term Capital Management; ERM:
Exchange rate mechanism.
financial crisis. The ERM crisis hit the financial system in Italy particularly
hard. The Italian Lira devalued by 7 percent with the consequence that Italy
withdrew from the European Monetary System in September 1992. Real effec-
tive exchange rate volatility soared in 1992 reaching a record high. Also returns
on bank equities came under pressure as Italian banks held a large part of their
liabilities in foreign currency. The global financial crisis had similar repercus-
sions on financial markets in Italy, although the banking sector was affected to
a much lower extent than those in France or Germany. Finally, the European
sovereign debt crisis led to another increase in the FSI, principally because gov-
ernment bonds came under pressure. However, the impact of the crisis on the
banking sector seems to have had a rather limited effect.
Japan
The FSI for Japan exhibits two very strong increases over the sample period.
The first stress event was the Japanese stock market crash, when the Nikkei
dropped by about 50 percent in 1990. THis event was the beginning of a
persistent economic stagnation and Japan’s lost decade. The second main stress
event was the global financial crisis 2008-2009. Because of its regional vicinity
to the other Asian countries, the Asian crisis was another noticeable financial
stress event in Japan. Other international financial stress events such as the oil
crisis 1973-1974 and the global stock market crash in 1987 had a rather limited
impact on financial stress in Japan.
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Figure D10: FSI and stress components for Japan
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
2
4
6
8
FSI Japan
In
d
ex
Domestic stress
External stress
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
6
Stock market volatility
In
d
ex
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
5
10
FX volatility
In
d
ex
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
6
Stock market returns
In
d
ex
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
6
Government bond volatility
In
d
ex
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
6
8
Banking sector volatility
In
d
ex
Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
Table D10: Selected events in Japanese economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis
1990 Nikkei crash – Tokyo stock market index falls by 50 percent
1990-1992 Banking crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
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Mexico
Figure D11: FSI and stress components for Mexico
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
In 1982, Mexico declared its inability to service the outstanding debt to their
creditors and defaulted on its outstanding loans. The legacy of these events
was reflected in financial stress increases in the following years: in 1987 stock
markets in Mexico were heavily affected by the global stock market crash and
banks still had to cope with balance sheet imbalances from the past decade.
In the beginning of the 1990’s, banking sector volatility significantly increased,
which led to widespread strains in the financial system.
Table D11: Selected events in Mexican economic history
1982 Default on outstanding debt (LDC crisis), Peso currency turmoil
1995 Mexican Peso crisis (Tequila crisis)
1999 Brazilian crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
Notes: LDC: Less-developed countries.
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he Mexican Peso crisis was by far the most prominent increase in financial
stress in Mexico. In 1994 the Mexican central bank had to give up the fixed
exchange rate peg to the US-Dollar. This triggered a strong outflow of private
capital and government bonds came under pressure. A standby credit agreement
with the IMF and the World Bank finally led to appreciable decreases in the FSI
in 1995. However, the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 1999 led to pressures
on government bonds again and to large losses in the banking sector. Finally,
the global financial crisis had an impact on financial stress in Mexico. However,
the magnitude of financial stress was rather limited and mainly due to the
heavy financial market turmoils in Mexico’s most important trading partner,
the United States.
Netherlands
Figure D12: FSI and stress components for the Netherlands
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The FSI for the Netherlands is mainly characterized by an outstanding in-
crease of financial stress during the global financial crisis. All other events, such
as the oil crisis in 1973-1974, the global stock market crash in 1987, the legacy
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Table D12: Selected events in Dutch economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis
1987 Global stock market crash
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2004 Legacy of dotcom bubble
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis
Notes: LTCM: Long Term Capital Management.
of the burst of the dotcom bubble and the European sovereign debt crisis had
only minor effects. This is particularly due to the exceptionally high stress in
the Dutch banking sector during the years 2008 and 2008.
South Africa
Figure D13: FSI and stress components for South Africa
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The FSI of South Africa is strongly correlated to the external trade-weighted
stress index. Although South Africa has a relatively low degree of financial
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openness, the financial system seems to be very vulnerable to external financial
stress shocks. Outstanding global events that had a major impact on the South
African financial system were the global stock market crash 1987, the Asian
and Russian crisis 1997-1998, and the global financial crisis 2008-2009.
Table D13: Selected events in South African economic history
1987 Global stock market crash
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
Notes: LTCM: Long Term Capital Management.
South Korea
Figure D14: FSI and stress components for South Korea
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The most important financial stress event for South Korea over the sample
period was the Asian crisis in 1997/1998. Stock market volatility rose sharply,
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returns on equity plummeted, and government bonds came under pressure.
Similarly to the global stock market crash in 1987, the global financial crisis
had only a minor impact on financial stress in South Korea.
Table D14: Selected events in South Korean economic history
1987 Global stock market crash
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
Notes: LTCM: Long Term Capital Management.
Spain
Figure D15: FSI and stress components for Spain
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
Spain experienced several peaks of high financial stress in the past forty years.
After a period of strong economic performance after the Franco regime, when
financial markets were more and more opened, financial markets experienced a
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significant turmoil in 1987. Spain was mainly affected by this event due to its
exposure to Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and
Venezuela. During this time period both Argentina and Venezuela underwent a
exchange rate crisis and tried to restructure their debt. Spanish investors were
directly hit by these events. The ERM crisis also had significant repercussions
on financial markets in Spain as the country had to bear significant losses in
competitiveness vis-à-vis countries like Germany. The Asian and Russian crisis
also hit the financial system hard. The FSI increased to a record high, mainly
because the Spanish banking sector was strongly affected. Finally, the global
financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis were main events that
led a widespread financial stress in Spain. While the global financial crisis was
primarily due to banking problems, the European sovereign debt crisis affected
the Spanish government bond market.
Table D15: Selected events in Spanish economic history
1987 Global stock market crash
1990-1991 German reunification; Collapse of Soviet Union
1992-1993 ERM crisis
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2001 Terror attacks in the United States
2004 Legacy of dotcom bubble
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
2010-2012 European sovereign debt crisis
Notes: LTCM: Long Term Capital Management; ERM: Exchange rate mechanism.
Sweden
The most important financial stress event in Sweden was the banking crisis
in the early 1990’s. By the end of 1990 reported credit losses had increased
to around 1 per cent of lending, two to three times as much as during earlier
years (Englund (1999)). Accordingly, volatility in the banking sector was ex-
traordinarily high. When the crisis resolution had been completed, financial
stress in Sweden remained at very low levels until the outbreak of the global
financial crisis. However, the impact of this crisis on the Swedish financial sys-
tems remained relatively low, compared to the Swedish banking crisis in the
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early 1990’s. The European sovereign debt crisis had almost no impact on the
financial system in Sweden.
Figure D16: FSI and stress components for Sweden
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
Table D16: Selected events in Swedish economic history
1987 Global stock market crash
1992-1994 Swedish banking crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
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Switzerland
Figure D17: FSI and stress components for Switzerland
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The FSI for Switzerland can be characterized by three major peaks in the
sample period.
Table D17: Selected events in Swiss economic history
1987 Global stock market crash
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
Notes: LTCM: Long Term Capital Management.
First, the global stock market crash in 1987 had a relatively strong effect on
Swiss financial markets, especially on stock markets. Second, the collapse of
LTCM had strong repercussions on the banking sector in Switzerland. The FSI
indicates its record high during this stress event. Third, the global financial
crisis had a noticeable impact o financial stress, although the level remained
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significantly below the aforementioned financial stress events. The European
sovereign debt crisis seems to have had a negligible impact on financial markets
in Switzerland.
Turkey
Figure D18: FSI and stress components for Turkey
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
The first period of financial stress for Turkey occurred in the beginning of
the 1990’s, when especially stock market volatility was very high. Afterward,
the FSI peaks during the ERM crisis when the volatility of the Turkish lira
sharply increased. While the Asian and Russian crisis had also a significant
effect on financial markets in Turkey, the highest peak of financial stress was
during the Turkish crisis in 2001. After the acceptance of the Turkish govern-
ment to a standby agreement with the IMF, the index strongly declined, but
it rose again after the terror attacks in the United States in September 2001
and the beginning of the second gulf war shortly afterward. The global finan-
cial crisis had a rather external influence of financial stress in Turkey. While
the domestic FSI increased only slightly, the external financial stress index rose
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Table D18: Selected events in Turkish economic history
1991 Stock market turbulences
1992/1993 ERM crisis, Pressure on Turkish lira
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2001 Terror attacks in the United States
2003 Beginning of second gulf war
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
Notes: LTCM: Long Term Capital Management; ERM: Exchange rate mechanism.
sharply. Regarding the domestic stress variables, solely the volatility on Turk-
ish government bonds soared during the global financial crisis. The European
sovereign debt crisis had almost no influence on financial stress in Turkey. For
a more detailed description of the events of high financial stress in Turkey see
Cevik et al. (2013).
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United Kingdom
Figure D19: FSI and stress components for the United Kingdom
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
2
4
6
FSI United Kingdom
In
d
ex
Domestic stress
External stress
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
6
Stock market volatility
In
d
ex
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
6
8
FX volatility
In
d
ex
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
Stock market returns
In
d
ex
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
Government bond volatility
In
d
ex
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
2
4
6
8
Banking sector volatility
In
d
ex
Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
Table D19: Selected events in British economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis
1981 LDC crisis
1987 Global stock market crash
1992-1993 ERM crisis
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2001 Terror attacks in the United States
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
Notes: LDC: Less-developed countries; LTCM: Long Term Capital Management; ERM:
Exchange rate mechanism.
The financial system of the United Kingdom experienced several periods of
financial stress over the sample period. Being an industrial country dependent
on oil, the oil crisis 1973-1974 had noticeable effects on financial stress. Over the
course of time, the global stock market crash in 1987 was an event that hit the
financial system in the United Kingdom particularly hard. The British stock
market index dropped by the end of October by about 27 percent. Subsequently,
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the FSI exhibits a strong increase during the ERM crisis when exchange rate
volatility soared. The collapse of LTCM in 1998 had only a very limited impact
on financial stress in the United Kingdom. While the highest peak of the FSI
was during the global financial crisis 2008-2009, the FSI remained at very low
levels during the European sovereign debt crisis. For a more detailed description
of the events of high financial stress in the United Kingdom see Christensen and
Li (2013).
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United States
Figure D20: FSI and stress components for the United States
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Notes: The solid blue line in the upper panel represents the the domestic FSI; the red
dashed-dotted line the external (trade-weighted) FSI.
Table D20: Selected events in American economic history
1973-1974 Oil crisis,
1981 LDC crisis
1982 Second oil crisis
1987 Global stock market crash
1997-1998 Asian crisis / Russian default
August / September 1998 LTCM crisis
2001 Terror attacks in the United States
2003 Beginning of second gulf war
2008-2009 Global financial crisis
Notes: LDC: Less-developed countries; LTCM: Long Term Capital Management.
In the United States, there were several remarkable periods of high financial
stress in the past four decades. The oil crisis in 1973-1974 led to the first
increase in the financial stress index. This event had mainly an impact on stock
markets: stock market volatility rose sharply and firms had to bear serious
losses. Although the United States were directly exposed to the LDC crisis
as a main creditor to Latin American countries in 1982 and government bond
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volatility as well as interest rates were at record highs, financial markets were
not excessively affected. This dramatically changed in 1987, when the stock
market indexes hit rock bottom. Initiated by Black Monday 1987, return on
assets of the US banking industry plummeted substantially, bringing down total
total earnings for US banks for about two years. While the ERM crisis had no
measurable effect on financial stress in the United States, the default of the
hedge fund LTCM during the Asian / Russian crisis led to a sharp increase
in the FSI. For a detailed description of the events of high financial stress see
Hatzius et al. (2010), Hakkio and Keeton (2009), and Cardarelli et al. (2011).
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Final remarks
This dissertation presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects
of macroeconomic uncertainty and financial stress on economic activity. It
shows that a better understanding of the interdependencies of financial and
macroeconomic developments are essential for business cycle analysis and policy
advice. Moreover, it provides analytical tools for monitoring financial stability
in real time using a broad set of financial stress indexes for several countries.
The results of this dissertation have important implications for economic
policy. Due to the strong economic impact of financial shocks, monitoring
financial stress should be of interest for both monetary and fiscal policy makers.
Above all, it is important to identify financial imbalances and financial stress
at an early stage in order to implement appropriate policy measures. The
results provide a guidance for considering monetary and macroprudential policy
decisions during times of financial stress. In addition, the results are relevant
for macroeconomic forecasting. In a situation of macroeconomic uncertainty
and financial stress, forecasters may take these developments into account and
be more pessimistic for the economic outlook. Finally, since financial stress is
significantly synchronized internationally, this dissertation claims that it is very
important to consider its global dimension, even from the perspective of national
policy makers. As a bottom line, the general intention of this dissertation is to
improve the understanding between financial and macroeconomic developments.
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